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Introduction 
On October 23rd, 1962, as a result of information received from 
intelligence sourccsl concerning the installation of Soviet surf ace-to-
surface medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba, the United States 
government proclaimed a quarantine on the island for the purpose of pre-
venting any further importation of these missiles into Cuba and for 
procuring the removal of those already there.2 The quarantine was put 
into effect by UoS. Naval Forces on October 24th, was denounced in the 
Security Council by Cuba as "an act of war, 113 and by the Soviet Union 
as a "threat of war 114 in violation of the United Nations Charter. 
The result of the quarantine was a qualified success for the 
United States. The Soviet Union elected not to challenge the quarantine,5 
lDetails are contained in an interim report by the U.S. Congress, 
Senate, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed 
Services, 88th Congress, 1st Session, on s. Res. 75 on The Cuban Hilitary 
Buildup (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963). 
2rnterdiction of ~ Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba, 
Proclamation No. 350h, 27 Fed. Reg. 10401, reprinted in ~ Department of 
State Bulletin Vol. XLVII (November 1962), p. 717; hereinafter referred 
to as Interdiction Proclamation. 
3statement of 1vfr. Garcia Inchaustegui (Cuba), U.N. Security Council 
Official Records, 17th year, 1022pd Meeting (23 Oct. 1962), p. 22 (s7PV 1022). 
4statcment of ~.ir. V.A. Zorin (USSR), U.N. Security Council 
Official Records, 17th year, 1022nd Meeting (23 Oct. 1962), p. 36 (S/PV 1022). 
5SiA'teen out of 18 Soviet dry-cargo ships enroute to Cuba, presume-
ably those containing quarantined items, reversed course and returned to 
the Soviet Union. Briefing given by John Hughes, Defense Intelligence 
Agency, Department ~ Defense .APEropriations for 1964, Hearings Before a 
Subcommittee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 
1st Session, Part 1. February 6, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1963), p. 13. 
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~d the missiles were withdrawn. In exchange, the Soviet Union received 
a carefully worded pledge not to invade Cuba. The success of the operation 
did not, however, resolve the problem of its legality. 
There was a fairly convincing prima facie case that the United 
States had broken the law. It had interfered with the well established 
principle of freedom of the seas by claiming the right of taking into 
custody any vessel which failed to submit to visit and search. By all 
appearances the disposition of naval vessels resembled a blockade.6 Also, 
it had in contravention of Article 2(4)7 of the U.N. Charter clearly 
announced that it would use force in case of failure or refusal to comply 
with the quarantine instructions.8 
Two lines of defense against the prima f acie charge of illegality 
were formulated. One was the plea of self-defense9 and the other was the 
claim the quarantine was a legitimate regional peace-keeping action with-
in the terms of the U.N. Charter. Along both these paths, however, there 
6compare the operational features of the quarantine with the 
traditional law of blockade as set forth in Chapter I, Declaration 
Concerning the Laws of Naval Warfare, S. Doc. No. 563, 63rd Congress, 
2nd Session, 1914. 
?Article 2(4) states: 11All Members shall refrain in their inter-
national relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner incon-
sistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." 
8rnterdiction Proclamation, loc. cit. 
9Argurne.nt most powerfully advanced by Myres S. McDougal, 11The · 
Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense," American Journal of Inter-
national Law, Vol. 57 (July, 1963), 597. 
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were the lecal trip wires of Articles 5110 and 53(1)11 respcctively.12 
The legal spokesmen of the United States, reserving their position 
on the question of self-defense, and after cutting through the restraint 
imposed by Article 53(1), contended that the quarantine did not contra-
vene Article 2(4) "because it was a measure adopted by a regional organ-
ization in conformity with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter. 1113 
Furthermore, they argued that the charge of illegal blockade was not 
relevant because there had been no assertion of a state of war or· belliger-
ency which is implicit in the rules of blockade.14 
How did they arrive at these conclusions? How good is their 
argument? What implications does it hold for international law? 
Statement of Purpose 
The purpose of this research paper is to analyze the United States 
justification for the Cuban quarantine to determine: (1) how it was 
developed; (2) how well it sustains the legal validity of the quarantine; 
and (3) what precedent, if any, it established in international law. 
lOArticle 51 states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self defense if armed attack 
occurs •••• " 
11Article 53(1) states: 11 ••• no enforcement action shall be 
taken under regional arrangements or agencies without the authorization 
of the Security Council •••• 11 
12G.S. Windass, "The Cuban Crisis and World Order, 11 International 
Relations, Vol. III (April, 1966), 3• I am >:.-:; indebted to Mr. Windass 
for most of the structure of these introductory remarks. 
13Article by the Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State, Leonard 
c. Meeker, 11 Defensive Quarantine and the Law," American Journal of Inter-
national Law, Vol. 57 (July, 1963), 523. 
14Ibid., p. 515 
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Significance of Research 
The major significance of this work is in the way it analyzes the 
justification as a developmental process. The usefulness of this approach 
is that it retains the contextual framework in which the decisions at each 
step were made thereby providing additional insight into the current status 
of the law. 
Limitations 
Since so many non-legal facets of the incident are related directly 
or indirectly to the reasons why the particular mode of justification was 
adopted, no precise statement can be given with reference to the limita-
tions which will be imposed on this study. In general, however, this 
paper will not attempt to delineate in any great detail the operation 
of the quarantine, nor discuss the diplomatic bargaining that preceded 
the settlement except for purposes of continuity. 
Organization of the Paper 
The body of this paper is organized to support the hypothesis that 
the United States justified the quarantine as a regional peace-keeping 
operation under OAS authorization for the following series of reasons: 
(1) it was faced with an unprecedented threat to its security that required 
removal; (2) the removal could only be accomplished by the threat or use 
of force; (3) the United Nations could not have brought force to bear to 
relieve the threat; (4) the United States could bring force to bear in 
the form of a quarantine; (5) the United States desired to leg:i.Jtimize 
the use of force in order to improve the probability of acquiescence; 
ix 
(6) the United States also desired to avoid Article 51 as authority for 
the quarantine so as not to set a precedent. 
In order to secure OAS authorization and remain in conformity 
with Chapter VIII of tho United Nations Charter, two conditions had to 
be fulfilled: A t'wo-thirds vote of approval by the OAS members was 
required, and the obstacle of Article 53(1) had to be overcome. 
Chapter I describes the relevant pre-crisis events. Wedged in 
between a principle of non-intervention and a Pan-Americanized Monroe 
Doctrine, the United States found its options extremely limited. As 
the Cuban military build up continued, frustrations piled up until the 
discovery of surf ace-to-surf ace missiles sparked the tension into open 
crisis. 
Chapter II describes the considerations the EXCOM15 went through 
in developing tho United States case. The implications of the threat, 
the United Nations, the selection of quarantine, and the mode of 
legitimizing are all taken up in this chapter. 
The results of the decisions made in the EXCOM are · examined in 
Chapter III. The first condition in the hypothesis statement is met, 
and a description of the crisis events leading up to settlement is in-
eluded. 
In Chapter IV attention turns to an analysis of how the second 
condition is argued. United States legal spokesmen attempt to "prove" 
that the quarantine does not violate Article 53(1) effectively allowing 
the OAS to do its own policing without any control from the Security Council. 
15EXCOM.: an abbreviation for Executive Conunittee of the National 
Security Council. That group of fourteen men who sat as Presidential 
advisers during the crisis. Names are listed in Theodore c. Sorensen 
Kennedy (New York: Bantam, 1966), p. 760. 
Chapter V re-ex.amines the generalization, arrives at conclusions 
concernin6 the major findings of the analysis, and discusses the 
precedential worth of the case for international law. 
Aclmowledt;rnents 
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CHAPTER I 
PRE-CRISIS EVENTS 
The events prior to the outbreak of the crisis form an important 
backdrop to the development of this case. They describe a situation in 
which deteriorating United States-Cuban relations became increasingly 
worse as the Soviet Union embarked on an attempt to ex~end its influence 
into the Western Hemisphere. While the United States observed a policy 
of restraint, frustrations continued to grow, warnings were issued, 
and the limit of tolerance was finally reached. 
I. UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH CUBA AND THE OAS 
The Objection ~ the Castro Regime 
Basically, the fundamental objection of the United States to the 
Castro regime was strategic and military. It had been a long standing 
tradition in American foreign policy that Cuba should not become a base 
from which an extracontinental power could launch an attack against the 
United States. The dreaded prospect materialized when Castro aligned 
himself with the Soviet bloc.16 
16Ambassador Stevenson made this point clear in his address to the 
Security Council on 23 October 1962, stating that the crucial fact about 
Cuba was not that it was revolutionary, socialistic, or dictatorial, but 
that it had "given the Soviet Union a bridgehead and a staging area in 
this Hemisphere •••• 11 
2 
In 1958 the United States had indirectly assisted Castro in coming 
to powero Suspending arms shipments to the Batista government at a time 
when it was attempting to suppress th3 revolutionary movement, the United 
States appeared to welcome Castro and his promises of social and agrarian 
reform; but soon after Castro took office:the cordiality began to disappear. 
Properties of United States citizens were confiscated or expropriated; 
Communist influence on tre island was permitted to grow; and close diploma-
tic, economic, and military contacts were established with the Sino-Soviet 
bloco In an atmosphare exacerbated by Castro's vehement attacks against 
the United States, diplomatic relations were terminated in January 1961.17 
~ Problem Faced .!?z ~ United States 
As the situation steadily worsened, the United States found itself 
in a quandry over h~d to resolve the problem Cuba posed to its security 
in view of a self-declared doctrine of nonintervention. In retailiation 
for confiscation of American properties, the Cuban sugar import quota was 
steadily reduced, and additional economic sanctions were applied in the 
hope that they would restrain Castro's hostile attitude towards the United 
States; however, the desired effect was largely offset by Soviet aid, and 
Castro became even more defiant. It soon became apparent that some other 
solution to the problem would be required, and in the latter part of 196018 
a secret plan was formulated by the United States. Cuban exiles, eager 
l?Events in United States-Cuban Relations, A Report Prepared by 
the Department or-state for the Committee on Foreign Relations, United 
States Senate, 88th Congress, 1st Session, January 29, 1963 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 1-15. 
18The year 1960 is an estimate based on Roger Hilsman•s statelll3nt 
that the Eisenhower acblinistration armed and trained the Cuban refugee 
force. Mr. Hilsman was Director of Intelligence and Research of the 
Department of State during the Kennedy Administration. Roger Hilsman, 
To Move !, Nation (Garden Ci~ New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 30. 
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to return to their homeland, went into training for an invasion of Cuba 
under CIA direct:Lon.19 When the Kennedy Administration came into office, 
the plan was approved for execution. The result was the ill-fated Bay of 
Pies invasion. United States complicity in the fiasco was exposed, and 
the result, as conservatively stated by Mr. deLessups s. Morrison, United 
States Representative to the OAS, was a loss of popular support for the 
United States in Latin America.20 
United States Success in Rallyin& OAS Support 
Up until the latter half of 1960, the Latin American members of 
the OAS were not really convinced that Cuba was not just an American 
obsession. But then an awareness that the Castro regime constituted a 
threat.to their security began to emerge. By January 1962, a total of 
13 of the OAS members had broken diplomatic relations with Cuba. 
Commencing in August 1960, the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers, 
meeting at San Jose, Costa Rica, approved the Declaration of San Jose, 
stating that the acceptance by an American state of extracontinental 
intervention endangered American solidarity and ~ecurity.21 Following 
this, on 26 April 1961, the Council of Delegates to the Inter-American 
Defense Board excluded Cuba from the classified sessions of the board 
19rbido, pp. 30-39. 
20united States Congress, House of Representatives-Committee on 
Foreign Affairs. Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, 
Hearings before Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, 88th Congress, 
1st Session, Feb - Mar 6, 1963 (Washington, GPO, 1963), p. 228. 
21Events in United States-Cuban Relations, .2.E• cit., p. 17. 
"while the present and evident military alliance exists between Cuba 
22 . 
and tho Soviet bloc. 11 Then, early in 1962, the Eighth Meeting of 
4 
Foreign Ministers, meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay, gathered to affinn 
the incompatibility of Communism with the American System; to consider 
suspending all anns trade with Cuba; and to recorrunend exclusion of the 
Castro regime from the OAS. No serious resistance was encountered to 
the first and second matter, the third, however, was rejected by almost 
one third of the voting nations. The important opposition was not only 
due to the juridicial question of whether a member could be excluded with-
out amendment to the Charter of the Organization, 23 or the fear of domestic 
repercussions from groups sympathetic to Fidelismo, but also as Robert N. 
Burr has noted, from the "reluctance to establish the precedent of eject-
ing a member at the behest of the United States.1124 But since a two-thirds 
vote was sufficient, the resolution was passed. 
In the meantime, although a measure of success had been achieved 
in the OAS, it was not universally accepted by Congressmen in the United 
States as being completely adequate; and there emerged some strong doubts 
whether a traditional United States doctrine had not been compromised in 
exchange for a system of collective security. 
22organization of American States, Annual Report 1961, p. 12 
23Excerpts from Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the 
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Doc. 68 (1962). 
24aobert N. Burr, Our Troubled Hemisphere, (Washington: The 
Brookings Institution, 197lfi, p. 28. 
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IIo DOMESTIC PRESSURES 
At home the Administration came under constant pressure to do 
something about Castro. There was evidence of an increased Soviet arms 
buildup on the island25 and public concern was intensifying. It was not, 
however, a case of "do nothing" as Senator Keating and others claimed. 
In February 1962, the President had made the embargo on trade with Cuba 
substantially complete; 26 and in the meanwhile, surveillance flights over 
the island kept a watchful eye out for any new development. 
Discovery of Surface 12 Air Missiles 
On 29 August 1962, on a routine U-2 overflight, positive identi-
fication was established of a surface-to-air missile installation known 
as a SAM-2. Two sites were specifically located and six others were 
tentatively identified. 27 A close review of the entire military buildup 
prompted President Kennedy to draw the line of tolerable limit, and on 
4 September he issued the following statement: 
Information has reached this Government in the last four 
days from a variety of sources which establishes without doubt 
that the Soviets have provided the Cuban Government with a 
number of anti-aircraft defense missiles with a slant range of 
twenty-five miles which are similar to early models of our Nike. 
There is no evidence of any organized combat force in Cuba 
from any Soviet bloc country; of military bases provided to 
.Russia; of a violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo; 
25The Cuban lii.litary Buildup, op. cit., PP• 5-8. 
26cuba, Q.uestions and Answers, Department of Defense Pamphlet 
GEl'J'-2 dated 29 Oct 1962 (Washington: GFO, 1962), p. 3. 
27Briefing given by Robert s. McNamara, Secretary of Defense. 
United States Congress, House of Representatives, Conunittee on Appropri-
ations, De:oartment of Defense Appropriations for 1964, Hearings before 
a Subco~Jllittee of the Conunittee of Appropriations, 88th Congress, 1st 
Session, Feb. 6, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 3. 
of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles; or of 
other significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or 
under Soviet direction and guidance. Were it to be otherwise 
the gravest issues would arise. 
It continues to be the policy of the United States that the 
Castro regime will not be allowed to export its aggressive pur-
poses by force or the threat of force. It will be prevented by 
whatever means may be necessary from taking action against any 
part of the Western Hernisphere.28 
Significance of the President's Statement 
In the statement above what the President did was to issue a 
warning. He was "justifying not acting up to a certain point; 11Z9 and 
had specified those conditions which would trespass on United States 
security. Also, he drew a distinction between offensive and defensive 
missiles. On this point there has been much wrangling. Some writers 
have mistakenly dismissed out of hand the usefulness of the terms 
attributing too much to the intent of the user.30 To argue this way 
is to fail to see what the President was saying. Clearly enough he 
only placed one type of missile in the offensive category: ground-
to-ground missiles. The pertinent question then becomes, did the 
Soviet Union understand? Correctly, Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter 
are of the opinion that the Soviets did, and they cite that portion 
of the Russian response of 11.September which denied the need to shift 
28staternent by President Kennedy, Q.§. Department of State 
Bulletin, Volume XLVII, No. 1213 (September 24, 1962), 450. 
29Roberta. Wohlstetter, 11 Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and 
Foresight," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43 (July, 1965), 700. 
6 
30\·lindass, .2.E· cit., p. l, and Quincy Wright, 11 The Cuban 
Quarantine, 11 A ..'11erican Journal of International ~' Vol. 57 (July, 1963), 551. 
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the type missile the President had categorized as offensive.31 One 
additional observation on the same reply is worth noting. It is known 
today that on 11 September, Soviet ground-to-ground missiles were enroute 
to, or arriving at Cuban ports. Yet, here is an example of how the Soviet 
Union used the intent argument to their own advantage: 
The annaiuents and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed 
exclusively for defensive purposes and the President of the United 
States and the American military just as the military of any country 
know what means of defense are. How can these means threaten the 
United States?32 
On 13 September the President responded to the Moscow statement of 
11 September by once again underlining what was not tolerable in the 
way of Soviet aid to Cuba: 
But let me make this clear once again: If at any time the 
Coill.luunist buildup in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our 
security in any way, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage 
to the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities at Cape 
Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens in this country, or if 
Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force 
or the threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or 
become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the 
Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to 
protect its own security and that of its allies.3.3 
31Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, "Controlling the Risks in Cuba," 
Adelohi Papers Number 17 (April, 1965) (London: The Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1965), p. 21. The authors' exact citation is quoted as follows: 
"· •• there is no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons • •• 
to any other country, for instance Cuba • • • the Soviet Union has rockets 
so powerful to carry ••• nuclear warheads that there is no· need to search 
for sites for them beyond the boundries of the Soviet Union ••• the 
Soviet Union has the capability from its own territory to render assistance 
to any peace-lovlng state and not only to Cuba. 11 (Tass press release of 
11September1962). ~ 
32The New~ Times, September 12, 1962, p. 16. 
33statement of President Kennedy, U.S. Department of State Bulletin 







On 13 September, by unanimous consent, the Committee on Foreign 
Relations and the Conunittee on Armed Services of the Senate met in joint 
8 
session to investigate whether or not the Monroe Doctrine had been violated, 
discarded, or strictly circumscribed by other multilateral agreements, and 
to consider several resolutions relating to the Monroe Doctrine situation 
in Cuba.34 This particular hearing·was not only important for its contri-
bution to the resolution that was finally adopted, but also for the 
definitive testimony that was given concerning the Doctrine, and certain 
assertions that were made with reference to the relevant principle of 
self defense. 
Secretary Rusk was the principal witness. First, he tried to define 
for the Senators what the Monroe Doctrine did not mean. Contrary to 
Senator Keating's interpretation, Secretary Rusk convincingly argued that 
the Monroe Doctrine did not give the United States the right to intervene 
in Cuba to restore independence and self-determination to the Cuban people. 
"This, 11 he said, 11would be the substance of the Platt Amendment. 1135 Next, 
Secretary Rusk attempted to indicate how the Doctrine ought to be executed 
in a modern day context. Affirming that the Monroe Doctrine was still "a 
part of our approach to our national security interests, 1136 he added that 
34united States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations 
and Committee on Armed Services, Situation in Cuba, Hearings, 87th Congress, 
2nd Session, on S.J. Res. 226 and others, Sept. 17, 1962 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1962),.p. 1 • 
.35Ibido, p. 67 
36rbid., p. 34 
9 
37 11 the method of carrying it out had been altered," because we could not 
"really act alone in these matters without heavily involving those who 
are closely allied with us.1138 In summary then, comparing the testimony 
of Secretary Rusk with the substantive words39 of the Monroe Doctrine, it 
appears that the hearings resulted in showing that the Doctrine had been 
amended in only one way: unilateral action without prior consultation of 
allies was ruled out. Since this procedure had been voluntarily entered 
into by the United States, the implication was that the Doctrine had not 
been handicapped. 
During the hearings certain statements were made concerning the 
principle of self defense. Some of these assertions were forthright, 
others were less clear, reflecting this author believes, the forgotten 
qualification that Article 51 of the United Nations Charter places on the 
notion of self defense. For example, Senator Miller was of the opinion 
that the Charter did not qualify the right of self defense in any sense: 
I recognize that the United Nations Charter is one that we are 
trying to live up to, but the inherent right of self-defense is 
recognized as being someBhing that is not obliged by the United 
Nations Charter •••• 4 
Similarly, Senator Hickenlooper expressed the same idea when he was 
37Ibid 
-
38rbid., p. 57 
39president James Monroe, announcing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, 
declared to the Congress trot we should consider any attempt on the part 
of European powers 11to extend their system to any portion of this hemis-
phere as dangerous to our peace and safety. 11 Ibid., p. 89. 






Senator Hickenlooper. Isn't there a provision in either the 
treaty or the collateral agreements to the effect that no country 
could invade or could enter the territory of another country except 
in self-defense? 1'hat in always reserved. It is an inherent right. 
Secretary Rusk: I think except in case of armed attack there 
was the obligation to consult.41 
The reason for introducing the foregoing at this point is to digress for 
a moment to illustrate how responsible officials perceive the meaning of 
self-defense as something inherent and self-defined. The problem is that 
the Charter sees it differently. This troublesome distinction will be 
discussed fully in the following chapters. 
At the conclusion of the hearings what resulted was a strong and 
meaningful resolution which read in part: 
Resolved~ the Senate ~ House of Representatives of the United 
States ~ America in Congress assembled, 
Tnat the United States is detennined--
(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the 
the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, 
by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activi-
ties to any part of this hemisphere; 
(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally 
supported military capability endangering the security of the United 
States; and 
(c) to work with the Organization of American States and with 
freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people 
for self-detennination.42 
The OAS Meeting of 2-3 October 
The next move by Washington was to call for an informal meeting 
of the foreign ministers to discuss the situation in Cuba. No new 
41rbid., p. 50. 
42s.J. Res. 230; passed by the Senate on Sept. 20th by a vote of 
86 to 1 and by the House of Representatives on Sept. 26th by a vote of 
384 to 7. Reproduced in The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XI.VII, 








announcements were made but it is worth :noting here for two reasons: 
(1) in their final communique the ministers observed that it was 
"Desireable to intensify individual and collective surveillance of the 
delivery of arms and implements of war and all other items of strategic 
importance to the communist regime in Cuba ••• ; 1143 and (2) it seemed 
to express considerably more solidarity than had heretofore been achieved. 
This author can only speculate, but it seems that in addition to trans-
mitting signals to Moscow, the Joint Resolution had as well been under-
stood by Latin America. 
Discovery of Surf ace-to-Surf ace Missiles 
As the month of October opened, the intelligence community in the 
United States began receiving more reports of large Soviet missile 
activity in Cuba. Such claims, the majority of which originated in 
unfounded refugee reports, were common in the past. However, this time 
four reports in particular aroused special interest. One told of hearing 
a loose tongued Cuban pilot boast that Cuba had long-range missiles and 
need no longer fear the United States; another two reported unusual 
activity at the Western end of the island associated with missiles; and 
the fourth told of a middle-of-the-night truck-trailer convoy moving 
long canvas covered crates toward the West. The Administration decided 
to investigate the reports with the U-2,44 and on 14 October a surface-
to-surf ace missile installation was discovered. 
43rnf ormal Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American 
Republics; The Deoartment of State Bulletin, Vol. XLVII, No. 1217 (October 
22, 1962), p. 600. 
44Hilsman, .2J2• cit., pp. 174-175. 
12 
Stmmiary 
The purpose of this first chapter was to present a narrative of 
the important events leading up to the crisis. There are at least two 
threads of thought in the events just described. One theme that comes 
through is the strength of multilateral arrangements. The United States 
went so far as to sponsor a surreptitious invasion of Cuba in order to 
serve its own national interests. Yet, when our involvement in the clan-
destine endeavor became known, the setback did not result in a rupture 
of the allianceo The other thread which can be identified is too critical 
role intelligence played in preparing for the eventuality. The early 
discovery of the surf ace-to-air missiles by the U-2 provided time for the 
Administration to formulate a policy, promulgate it, and obtain a solid 
expression of confidence from Congress--all before the existance of the 
surface-to-surface missiles were established. Thus, when the crisis broke 
the Administration was ready to handle the threat with many of the essential 
I 




The decision making process represents step two in the analysis of 
how the United States case was developed. When the crisis broke the 
EXCOM immediately went into session. The recomendations and decisions 
that were made in those sessions~ opened and closed certain doors leading 
eventually to how the United States would justify its case. The purpose 
of this chapter is to describe what considerations were undertaken, and 
through analysis and interpretation,determine those factors which were 
most influential in deciding the ultimate course of action. 
I. ESTIMATE OF THE THREAT 
After the U-2 photographs were developed, the first consideration 
the EXCOM had to go through was an appraisal of why the Soviet Union had 
implanted the missiles in Cuba. Theodore C. Sorensen, President Kennedy's 
Special Assistant, who sat as a member of the EXCOM through all its 
sessions has provided for us the f olloidng answers which are quoted 
in part: 
Theory I. Cold War Politics. Khrushchev believed that the 
American people were too timid to risk nuclear war and too concerned with 
legalisms to justify any distinction between our overseas missile bases 
and his - that once we were actually confronted with the missiles we would 
do nothing but protest - that we would thereby appear weak and irresolute 
to the world, causing our allies to doubt our word and to seek accomoda-
tions viith the Soviets, and permitting increased communist sway in Latin 
America in particular. This was a probe, a test of America's will to 
resisto 
Theory _g. Diverting Trap. If the United States did respond, 
presumably by attacking 11little 11 Cuba, the Allies would be divided, 
the United Nations horrified, the Latin Americans more anti-American than 












swiftly in on Berlin. 
Theory 2.• Cuban Defense. A Soviet satellite in the Western 
Hemisphere was so valuable to Khrushchev -in both his drive for expansion 
and his contest with Red China - that he could not allow it to fall; and 
thus, in his view, an invasion from the United States or hostile Latin-
American states, which seemed inevitable if Cuba collapsed internally, had 
to be prevented at all costs. 
Theory~· Bargaining B:i.rter. Well aware of Cuba's sensitive role 
in domestic American politics, Khrushchev intended to use these bases in 
a Su.11'Ilit or United Nations confrontation with Kennedy as effective 
bargaining power - to trade them off for his kind of Berlin settlement, 
or for a withdrawal of American overseas bases. 
Theory .2.• Missile Power. The Soviets could no longer benefit 
from the fiction that the missile gap was in their favor. To close it 
with ICBM 1s (intercontinental ballistic missiles) and submarine-based 
missiles was too expensive. Providing Cuban bases for their existing 
:MRBM' s and IRB!1 1 s (mediu,11 and intermediate range ballistic missiles) 
gave them a swift and comparatively inexpensive means of adding sharply 
to the total number of missiles targeted on the United States, positioned 
to by-pass most of our missile warning systems and permitting virtually 
no tactical warning time between their launch and their arrival on target.45 
In an analysis of the above theories Theodore Sorensen tells us 
that President Kennedy regarded the third and fifth theories as off erring 
likely but insufficient motives and that the President leaned most strongly 
on the first theory. Whichever theory was correct, it was the President's 
assessment that the Soviet move, if successful, would materially and 
politically alter the balance of power in appearances, and in matters of 
national will and world leadership, such appearances contributed to 
reality.46 As Arnold L. Horelick has written, 11It is difficult to con-
ceive of :any other measure that promised to produce so large an improve-
ment in the Soviet strategic position as quickly or as cheaply. 1147 
45sorensen, 2!!.• ~., pp. 762-764. 
46Ibid., p. 764. 
47Arnold L. Horelick, 11The Cuban Missile Crisis: An analysis of 
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Upon conclusion of the foregoing analysis, the EXCOM entered into 
a week long cautious weighing of all alternatives for the purposes of 
hammering out a final decision before the Soviet missile installations 
could become operational. 
II. ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED 
WHICH DID NOT CALL FOR MILITARY ACTION 
The 12£ Nothing Alternative 
As a course of action, 11 do nothing" was never formally considered,,.: 
but grew out of Secretary McNamara's argument that a missile is a missile. 
He contended that it made no difference whether the missiles were fired 
from the Soviet Union or Cuba, the effect was the same. Thus, the impli-
cation of McNamara's position was that the United States should do 
. 48 
nothing. 
Recalling the President's analysis of the strategic situation, 
it is obvious that 11 do nothing" was an unacceptable alternative. Besides, 
the Administration was already on record stating that such installations 
were unacceptable. Discussion of this alternative was terminated when 
Paul Nitze, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 
Affairs, called attention to the fact that the presence of missiles in 
Cuba would expose a large part of the American strategic bomber force 
based in the southeastern part of the United States to sudden attack on 
the ground with warning time cut from fifteen minutes to two or three 
minuteso 49 














The Diplomatic Alternative 
A direct diplomatic approach to Khrushchev, or Castro, or both, 
was seriously considered by the EXCOM. The proposal to Castro would take 
the fonn of a simple warning: either split off from the Soviets or else 
witness the island's downfall. This idea was set aside when the President 
reminded the EXCOl~ that the confrontation was one of Great Powers and that 
a solution \rould have to be found on that level.50 Towards the Russians, 
Adali Stevenson, then Ambassador to the United Nations, recommended offer-
ing an exchange: Jupiter missiles in Turkey for Soviet missiles in Cuba. 
President Kennedy rejected this suggestion on the grounds that such an 
exchange could wreck the Western alliance by seeming to confirm Charles 
de Gaulle's suspicion that the United States would abandon its partners 
when its own security was at stake.51 These considerations aside, an 
opportunity for diplomacy occurred on 18 October when the Soviet Foreign 
Minister, Andrei Gromyko, made a routine call on the President. 
Whether Gromyko knew of the existence of the missile installation 
or not is unknown, but the Administration thought he did. During the visit 
President Kennedy personally read to Gromyko the key sentences from 
his statement of 13 September to which Gromyko replied that the Soviet assistance 
to Cuba was solely for the purposes of contributing to the defense capabil- ; 
ities of Cuba, adding that if it were otherwise the Soviet Government would 
5°sorensen, .2E• ~., pp. 769-770 
51Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis, (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott 












never had become involved in rendering such assistance.52 As might have 
been expected, nothing came of this meeting because Kennedy had not 
formulated a plan of action at this time and was not prepared to tip his 
hand, and likewise Gromyko had no reason to 11 confess 11 about something that 
he did not know had been discovered. 
~ Take it to the United Nations Alternative 
None of the accounts of what went on in the ~OM elaborate to any: 
great extent why it was decided not to rely on the United Nations to 
provide a solution to the missile crisis. Surely this decision was made~ 
even though the United States went through the motions later on with good 
eff ect--simply because the quarantine action would have been incongruous 
with a contrary decision. Sorensen only tells us that the President 11was 
not willing to let the United Nations debate and Khrushchev equivocate 
while the missiles became operationa.i. 1153 Elie Abel adds that "arraigning 
the Soviet Union and Cuba before the United Nations Security Council held 
little promise for two reasons: the Russian veto and the fact that Valerian 
Zorin of the Soviet Union haprened to be Chairman of the Council for 
October. 1154 While the foregoing.might seem to provide a satisfactory 
explanation, this author is of the opinion that a more pointed argument 
was equally, if not more, applicable. 
52Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,'! Thousand Days, (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 671. 
53sorensen, ££• cit., p. 770. 
54Abel, ~· cit., p. 61. 
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Looking at the alternative aside from the general voting record of 
the Soviet Union,55 could it have been realistically expected that the 
Soviet Union would have approved of a resolution calling for the "Immediate 
dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and offensive wea-
pons?1156 ObViously not. There is more involved here than just the veto 
complaint. Such action would clearly have been contrary to Soviet interests, 
and to have expected different conduct on the part of the Soviet Union 
would not only have been naive, but ~rould not have recognized, as Inis 
. ! Claude has written, that 11the adoption of the veto provision was in itself 
j 
I j an aclmowledgment of the fact that the United Nations was neither intended 
1 j nor exp3cted to take collective action in opposition to the 'Will of a 
major power.1157 
Theory has it that the resolution could then have been taken to 
the General Assembly. Assuming that the odds would· have been favorable, 
which they were not, (the Soviet bloc could count on about 30-37 out of 
~- I 105 votes), and that passage could have been achieved, what would have 1 
55soviet use of the vet_o is tabulated in Sidney D. Bailey, 11Veto 
in the Security Council," International Conciliation, No. 566 
(January 1968), 5. 
56u.s. Draft Resolution presented to the U.N. Security Council, 
October 22, 1962. 
57rnis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New 
York: Random House, 1962), p. 162 •. -
58This estimate is borrowed from Henry M. Pachter, Collision 
Course (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 40. 11There are 12 Communist votes, 
plus Mali, Ghana, Guinea, and at least 5 of the 13 Arab states that often 
vote 'With the Soviet bloc--a total of 20 votes. The neutralist reservoir 
includes 8 states in Southeast Asia, probably 6 in Black Africa, the rest 
of the Arabs, and--except in hemisphere matters--Mexico, Brazil, Chile, 




















been the result? If the United Nations had attempted to compel the Soviet 
Union to submit to its will, the action would have degenerated into a 
major war.59 Also, there is the other side of the coin. Would not United 
States action had been much more difficult if it had been defeated in the 
General Assembly? 
The foregoing discussion has attempted to place the generalization 
that one often hears about the veto in its proper perspective in order 
to provide a more complete rationale why the United States should not 
have relied upon the United Nations to provide a solution to the crisis. 
While it may be said of the Security Council that 11the veto has largely 
disabled it from fulfilling its intended role in keeping peace,n60 the 
argument is not so persuasive in situations of this type. 
Thus, with the do nothing, diplomatic, and United Nations alter-
natives eliminated, it was perceived by the EXCOM that some threat or use 
of force by the United States would be required to persuade the Russians 
to do something they would not do otherwise. 
III. ALTER.J.lATIVES CONSIDERED WHICH 
INVOLVED THE USE OF FORCE 
The Invasion Alternative 
Invasion was the first method considered for removing the threat 
59Raymond Aron 1rwha t is a Theory of International Relations 11 
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 21(2), 1967, p. 191. The author 
has paraphrased Hr. Aron's words as was given in a hypothetical situation 
to apply to this particular case. 
60 Abram OE,yes, 11Law and the Quarantine of Cuba 11 Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 41, No. 3 (April 1963), 550-557. · 
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by use of force. The plan had one advantage that ncno of the other 
alternatives offerred: an opportunity to get rid of Castro. But although 
this incentive was attractive, other reasons prevailed heavily against it. 
There was the problem of concealment. To muster the invasion force, the 
secret could not be kept up to the moment of attack. Then, casualties 
would be high. Russians would undoubtedly be killed in the fighting, 
and this would further aggravate an already tense situation. And, finally, 
world opinion would raise a great cry of protest. 
The Air Strike Alternative 
Many members of the EXCOM believed that the best solution to the 
problem was a surprise air attack. The action ".J"Ould be directed precisely 
at the source of the ~eat and the results would be positive, quick, and 
decisive. While all this was true the opponents of the plan admitted, 
air attack had one serious deficiency, and ran the risk of two others; 
First, 100 percent success could not be guaranteed; ~his being the case, 
invasion would be required to complete the task. Second, the Russians 
manning the missile sites represented an independent variable. Would they, 
under attack, launch their missiles believing that World War III had begun? 
It could not be known that they would not. And lastly, what of Khrushchev's 
reactions. Would the cost in Russian lives impel him to retaliate, 
further widening and escalating the conflict? Very possibly it would.61 
In the discussions that followed the foregoing considerations, Robert F. 
Kennedy took the position that a surprise attack was immoral. He argued 
that the attack would not only do irreparable damage to the image of the 




conscience as well, adding that he did not want to see his brother go down 
in history as the American Tojo. 62 Dean Acheson sharply disagreed. Elie 
Abel recounts Acheson's reaction as follows: 
He rejected the Pearl Harbor analogy with majestic scorn. For 
more than a century the Monroe Doctrine had made clear to all the 
world that the United States would not tolerate the intrusion of 
any European power into the Americas, Acheson said. Now that it had 
happened, the intrusion could only be regarded as a definitely un-
friendly act. Both the President and the Congress had warned in 
unmistakeable terms that the United States would be forced to act 
if the Soviet Union installed offensive weapons in Cuba. He cited 
the Presidential warnings of September 4 and 13 and the Congressional 
resolution of October 3 authorizing the President to prevent 11by 
whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, 11 the 
creation in Cuba of a. foreign military base endangering the securiti3 of tre United States, surely that was warning enough, Acheson said. 
Following this verbal exchange, Elie Abel tells us that a bitter argument 
ensued between the Attorney General and the Former Secretary of State 
about the relevancy of moral considerations. While this may be an accurate 
description of the scene, it also seems worth adding that the debate might 
not have been one wholly devoted to morality as has beai portrayed. · Just 
as likely, both men, by implication, could have had different opinions 
about the opportunity cost of bombing. Kennedy arguing for the foregone 
opportunity of support from abroad an:i avoiding the risks of a Soviet 
reaction, while Acheson argued for the foregone opportl.lllity of removing 
the missiles quickly. 
The Blockade Alternative 
The blockade plan was conceived to prevent the further importation 
of missiles into Cuba. That it did not provide an immediate answer to the 
missiles already in place was a serious drawback that troubled tre minds 
of the plans proponents; a.S Sorensen asked himself: "How would it help 
62rfilsman, .2E• ill•, P• 203. 
63Abel, .2E• cit., p. 64-65. 
to get them out? 1165 Bu~ that difficulty was to be resolved later onl 
Of itself, blockade was not free of disadvantagos. It was recognized 
by the EXCOM to be an infringement on the principle of freedom of the 
seas, a tradition the United States had long upheld. Also, it might 
alienate many maritime nations who were friendly to the United States. 
And there was the larger problem that it was commonly regarded as an 
act of war, and war was not what the Administration wanted if it could 
be avoided. 
22 
On the plus side of the ledger, provided one necessary condition 
could be fulfilled, blockade had many distinct advantages i First, the 
blockade could be executed in steps of graduated severity. As time 
progressed, more pressure could be brought to bear by increasing the 
list of contraband. Then, it involved no irrevocable action such as 
invasion or air strike. There would.be no violation of Cuban territory, 
no loss of lives, and the risk of provoking the Soviets into a spasmodic 
reaction would be minimized. However, the necessary condition for the 
foregoing was Soviet acquiescence, which the Kremlinologists estimated 
to be high but not certain.66 
At this point let us pause for a moment to consider the situation• 
The accounts of the EXCOM sessions tell us that the President's advisers 
are strongly drawn to the blockade alternative facing three thorny 
problems: (1) blockade makes no provision for removing the missiles in 
place, (2) the most promis:ing course of action is also· considered an 
65sorensen, .21:!• ~., p. 781. 
66rbid., p. 777. 
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act of war, and (3) realization of the benefits of blockade rests on 
Soveit acquiescence; if the Soviet ships choose to ignore the blockade, 
United States Forces will have to fire first provoking a Soviet counter-
attack at sea or retaliatory move elsewhere.67 Problem (1) will be solved 
by the EXOM arid need not concern us for the moment. Problems (2) and (3) 
remain. Sorensen describes the impasse: 
We could not even be certain that the blockade route was open 
to us. Without obtaining a two-thirds vote in the OAS-which 
appeared dubious at best--allies and neutrals as well as adversaries 
might well regard it as an illegal blockade, in violation of the 
United Nations Charter and international law. If so, they might feel 
free to defy it.68 
., 
Sorensen is obviously talking about legitimizlng the blockade for the 
purpose of acceptance and a.'c'quiescence, but lie is doubtful of success 
without OAS authorization." Nevertheless, does the EXCOM reallX believe 
that the Soviets will be illfiuenced by legalities? Let us return to the 
j I ' •' ' 
',,1 •... 
session and find out. ~; ' • l ' 
Next c~~, the turn 1.of 1the lawyers to consider the legality of 
each alternat:i.:V~· Elie ,A~~~ states that Dean ,A.cheson took the position 
that "legal niceties we~e. ~.C? much pompous f oolishn~1s,s. in a situation 
where the essential security of the United Stat~s, its prestige, its 
, • 1 ,J 4 • , It' 
pledged word to defend. the Americas was thre8r~~ned. 1169 But George Ball 
argued that a naval ~lockade thou~ traditionally regarded as an act of 
war would have at least more of a "color of legality. u70 Following 
, I .. 
George Ball, Leonard}1eeker, the Deputy Legal Adviser for the State 




69Abel, . .£E• cit., P• 72. 
70rbid., PP• 72-73. 
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Department, suggested for the first tim9 that a nwoo change might be in 
order. Borrowing the phrase from Franklin D. Roosevelt•s 11quarantine the 
71 
aggrcssor 11 speech he proposed that the blockade might be better called 
72 
a 11 defensive quarantine. 11 The following day, more legal considerations 
were added. Llewellyn Thompson made the point that the Russians were 
impressed by legalities, am if tra OAS should pass a resolution endorsing 
the blockade, "Moscow might be inclined to take it seriously.1173 
Reviewing the foregoing comments, it is apparent that the opinions 
did express an affirmative answer to tra question previously posed. It 
does seem that the EXCOM did believe that tra law would, to some degree, 
influence the decision makers in the Kremlin, and thereby provide a measure 
of protection against the contingency discussed in Problem (3). The accounts 
of the sessions do not reflect a dissenting .opinion, and even Dean Acheson's 
remarks were not contrary to the majority view, but merely an expression of 
the uselessness of it all. 
Returning for a monent to Leonard Meeker•s recommendation on the 
name change, it should be emphasized that this suggestion was much more 
than just an exercise in semantics or a lawyer's trick to obfuscate the 
true nature of the operation. That the term 11quarantine 11 has elicited 
such cynical remarks is indeed regretable, since the term ma.de it possible 
for the United States to immediately communicate a non-belligerent intent 
to the Soviet Union, and made possib~e a solution to the dichotomous 
situation described in Problem (2). 
7lThe Public Papers ~ Addresses .2f. Franklin ~· Roosevelt, Vol. 6 
p. 406, 410. 
72Abel, .£Eo cit., Po 73 
73Ibid., Po 87. 
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On going to the OAS, it should be pointed out at this stage that 
nothing has been presented as to which authorizing article will be sought. 
All we know is that there is a desire to legitimize via the OAS. With 
this reminder it should also be emphasized,,as Elie Able has written,that 
"legalities had less to do with the choice than the practical argument 
that a naval blockade would avoid killing Russians and give the Kremlin 
some time to reflect.1174 
The ultimate deciding factor between air strike and blockade was 
McNamara's suggestion that the blockade preserved the initiative and re-
tained the option of making more choices. Arguing that the matter was 
not a question of this or that, he rationalized that the action could 
begin with blockade, and if that did not work then the United States 
could go to air strike, and finally invasion. This then was the solution 
to the question of how the blockade would address itself to the missiles 
already in place (Problem (1)). Each stage provided a pause in between 
and gave both the President and Khrushchev time to think. President 
Kennedy was to agree; it preserved his options and left some for Khrushchev 
too.75 
IV. TACTICAL DECISIONS 
ON THE EVE OF ANNOUNCEMENT 
Meeting with the National Security Council (NSC) 
. \ 
On Sunday, 21 October, the President met with the NSC. No new 
74Ibid., p. 73. 
75Ibid., p. 94. 
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developments were presented at this meeting, but for the scholarly 
purpose of this inquiry, it should be established that the United States 
clearly intended to use force. Many partisan analyzes of this case have 
made too much of the fact that force was never used. A classic example 
is given by Captain McDevitt 1s summarization that the "entire operation 
amounted to no more than a partial interruption of sea communications 
with Cuba. 1176 Such a conclusion denies the reality that "a legal norm, 
like a rubber band, cannot be stretched ~ infinitum without being broken. 11 77 
of 
The evidence of the intended use~f orce is contained in the conver-
sation that took place at this meeting of the NSC when the President 
asked the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., USN, 
to describe the plans and procedures for the blockade. These are 
Sorensen's recollections of the event: 
Admiral Anderson: Each approaching ship would be signaled to 
stop for boarding and inspection. Then, if no satisfactory response 
was forthcoming, a shot would be fired across her bow. Finally, if 
there was still no satisfactory response, a shot would be fired into 
her rudder to cripple but not to sink. 
President Kennedy: You're certain that can be done? 
Admiral Anderson: Yes sir.78 
The Draft of President Kennedy's Speech of 22 October 
The changes that went into the draft of the President's speech 
were significant and far reaching. Theodore Sorensen had written the 
speech the night before and it was presented to the EXCOM the following 
76cAPT Joseph Bo·McDevitt, USN, "The UN Charter and the Cuban 
Quarantine" 1 ~ JAG Journal, Vol. XVII, No. 3 (April-Y.iay 1963) 1 75. 
77ollver J. Lissitzyn, "International Law in a Divided World," 
International Conciliation, No. 542 (March, 1963), 25. -
78sorensen, ~· cit., P• 787. 
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day. The most significant change that was made had to do with Article 51, 
which, because of its importance, deserves special attention. 
Article 51 Considerations 
There have been numerous debates among scholars of international 
law on the applicability of Article 51 to this case.79 Specifically, the 
arguments have dealt primarily with the provocation criteria established 
by the term "if anned attack occurs." The controversy has resulted in the 
fonnation of two schools of thought on the subject: those who interpret 
the term broadly, and those who define it narrowly.SO Briefly, the broad 
constructionists argue that the term has to mean more than its plain 
literal interpretation because of reasons of custom. and the state-of-
the-art of modern day weaponry. The proponents of the customary reason 
maintain that in addition to Article 51 there is also a customary or 
traditional right of self-defense quite apart from the Charter which 
permits self-defense in the face of a threat, as well as, an armed attack.8~ 
I 
Those who support the state-of-the-art argument contend that armed attack 
must include the imminent threat of arrued attack--and that the right of 
self-defense is therefore anticipatory--because it would be absurd to 
require a state to refrain from taking measures for.its own self-defense 
·~79seo Proceedings of the American Society of Int?rnation~ Law, 1963, 
pp. 1-18, 145-153, 162-173; and Proceedings of ~ American Societi of 
International Law, 1964, pp. 1-9, 18-19. 
80The broad constructionists have the clear majority. 
81Brunson MacChesney, 11Some comments on the •Quarantine' of Cuba" 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 57 (July, 1963), PP• 592-597; 
Professor MacChesney' s article is particularly valuable for his discussion 
of the customary right. 
until the arrival of a devastating nuclear attack; this "would make self-
dcfense meaningless; there would be nothing left to defend.1182 On the other 
hn.nd, the narrow constructionists argue that armed attack has to be defined 
narrowly because to do otherwise is to invite excessive claims of solf-
defense. They argue that the Charter did intend to limit the traditional 
right of self-defense;83 that the concept of anticipatory self-defense 
is destabalizing because such an extension would replace a standard which 
is clear, unambiguous, subject to proof, and not easily open to misinter-
pretation or fabrication, with one which is "ambiguous, deceptive, and 
dangerously flexible. 1184 With th:isa arguments in mind, let us return to the 
EX COM. 
Up to this point the EXCOM is interested in legitimizing the 
quarantine for the purposes of acceptance and acquiescence. The recom-
mendation has been made to seek authority from the OAS which the President 
will soon approve. Now, in marches Theodore Sorensen with his draft of 
the speech. Sorensen tells us that when the President is asked tihow we 
would explain our action to other nations long living in the shadow of 
missiles;u85 his reaction is to delete "specific reference to armed 
attack under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter1186 and substitute 
82c.G. Fenwick, "The Quarantine Against Cuba: Legal or Illegal? 11 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 57 (July, 1963), 589. 
83wright, .212• cit., p. 560. · 
841ouis Henkin, nrnternational Law and National Behavior, 11 
Recueil Des Cours (Hague Academy of International Law), 1965-1 
(Printed in the Netherlands: A.W. Sijthoff, 1965), P• 266. 




the following words (which appeared in the released text): 
We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons 
represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute 
maximwn peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive, and ballistic 
missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility 
of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be 
regarded as a definite threat to peace.87 
Who prompted the change? Although Ted Sorensen does not say, Elie 
Abel suggests that it was Abrani. Chayes, the State Department's Legal Advisor. 
According to Abel, Chayes argued for the deletion of Article 51 on the 
' grounds that it would provide the Russians with a precedent that they might 
use in the future. Instead of Article 51, Chayes recommended that the legal 
basis of the blockade should be the right of the OAS to take collective 
security measures.88 Unfortunately, Elie Abel does not elaborate on what 
Chayes might have meant by the term 11collective security measures"; therefore, 
we must spectulate a bit further. 
Recalling that the EXCOM is interested in promoting acquiescence, 
the importance of Chayes• suggestion lies in the contribution it made to 
that goal. By stating that the blockade's legal basis should be the right of the 
OAS to take collective security measures, he is betting that the probability 
of a violent reaction will be greatly reduced if the operation is wrapped 
in a cloth of broader authority. Analogous to the situation in everyday 
life, an ordinary citizen under threat of attack has a perfectly legal right 
to invoke self defense. However, if that same person is interested in ward-
ing off his attacker, then his security is improved if he can have himself 
deputized. 
87Ibid. 
88Abel, op. cit., p. 105. Technically, Article 51 and "collective 
security measures" are not mutually exclusive. Art. 3 of the Rio Treaty 
explicitly provides for collective security measures and makes direct refer-
ence to Art. 51. In this case thoughJ it is believed that Chayes did not use 
the term with Art. 3 in mind. ', 
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No one will argue that "ar-illed attack" (in tho literal nonoo) had 
occurred. But to say that the United States was not acting according to 
principles of self-defense is to deny the President's words. A close 
reading of the President's rephrasing of Article 51 suggests that in this 
particular situation "if armed attack occurs" meant to him 11if any sudden 
change in the deployment of ballistic missiles occurs." From a legal point 
of view, it can hardly be argued that there is any rule of international 
law that requires nations to give publicity to their defensive arrange-
ments. But on the other hand, "if two men are trying to maintain a see-
saw in precarious equilibrium, then the force of the argument against 
sudden and unannounced moves becomes immediately apparent. 1189 Therefore, 
this author is of the opinion that the United States and/or the OAS could 
have, if they had wished, used Article 51 to authorize the quarantine as 
an individual or collective self-defense measure under the so called rule· 
of uberrima fides, where a treaty admits of two constructions, the one 
giving the most favorable right is to be preferred.90 But why--and here 
is where a lawyer's appreciation of the finer aspects of the law came 
into play--establish a precedent which may some day be used against you 
if a more convenient provision is already available (albeit that it~ use 
will involve some stretching of Article 53(1)),· namely Article 6 and S 
of the Rio Treaty which provides for the use of armed force "if the 
89windass, .2E•...£it:.•, P• 12. 
90Territory of Hawaii v. Ho, 41 Hawaii Reports 565 (S. Ct. Hawaii 
1957) in Abram Chayes, ~· !1• ~ International Legal Process, Vol I., 
unpublished, p. 112. 
inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or 
political independence of any American State should be affected by an 
aggression which is ~ an armed attack •••• u9l (emphasis supplied) 
The above, then, are believed to be the reasons for the first 
change to the ·draft of President Kennedy• s speech. 
91!ho Rio Treaty provides for collective action, not only in the 
case of armed attack, which is covered by Article 3, but also: 
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If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the 
sovereignty or political independence of any American State should 
be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack • • • or 
by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of 
America ••• 
(Article 6) 
In such cases, the Organ of Consultation, consisting of the Foreign 
Ministers of the Member States, or representatives specifically designated 
for the purpose, is to 
meet i.Imnediately in order to agree on the measures which must be 
taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, 
in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common 
defense and for the rraintenance of the peace and security of the 
Continent. (Article 6) 
The Organ of Consultation acts 11by a vote of two-thirds of the Signatory 
States which have ratified the Treaty. 11 (Article 17) 
The treaty is explicit· as to the measures which may be taken by the Organ 
of Consultation in any situation covered by Article 6. These measures are 
listed in Article B and specifically include "use of armed force. 11 
Article 20 further specifies that decisions to take1 any of the measures 
listed in Article B shall be binding, except that "no State shall be required 
to use armed force without its consent." 
The foregoing explanation is borrowed in format from Meeker, 
£E• cit., Po 516 I 
Going 1£ ~ OAS 
In his book 11!£ Missile Crisis, Elie Abel tells us that "Edwin 
~fa.rtin, the able, methodical Assistant Secretary of State for inter-
American affairs, estimated there was one chance in four that the 
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Organization of American States would approve the quarantine action by 
the necessary two-thirds majority.1192 Whether Edwin Martin had perceived 
the odds correctly was not so important ~s recognizing the necessity of 
accepting the element of risk. This the President did, realizing that 
rejection of the United States' request would not only be embarrassing, 
but would provide the Soviet Union with a propaganda tool as well, and 
make the case less 11saleable 11 to world public opinion. 
When the President was asked ir' he would initiate the quarantine 
without OAS approval, his answer was: yes, because United States national 
security was directly involved; but hoping to obtain OAS endorsement, 
Sorensen observed that 11he deliberately obscured this question in his 
speech by a call for unspecified OAS action and an announcement of the 
blockade and other steps 'in defense of our own security' • 1193 Later, 
when Abram Chayes was asked if the United States had only considered the 
OAS as a "rubber stamp11 for its policy, he replied that 
the attitude of the United States towards what is now the Organiza- , 
tion of American States has been one mainly of getting what in govern-
ment one would call 'clearance' for action by us. We have not asked the 
Organization of American States, we have not asked our sister republics 
92Abel, .2.E• ~., p. 104. 
93sorensen, .2.E• .£i!., P• 787. 
in World War II, or later, to take action along with us. We have 
really asked them to permit us to act without objection by them.94 
The foregoing statement seems to be contrary to the evidence in 
this case. 
Final Changes. Two additional changes were made to Sorensen's 
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draft. In a pair of major decisions, the word quarantine was substituted 
for blockade,95 and at Adali Stevenson's suggestion, the phrase "render the 
missiles inoperable" was changed to read "dismantle and remove.1196 
Summary 
The foregoing chapter has inquired into the decision making process 
for the purpose of describing and applying analysis to the reasons be-
hind the justification. It is believed that the .following has been 
established: The United States chose not to rely on the United Nations 
to provide a solution; the quarantine.was selected as a nonbelligerent 
first application of least force; the desire to legitimize with OAS 
authority was in order to improve the probability of acquiescence by 
endowing the quarantine force with an aura of legality; and the desire 
not to cite Article 51 was in order to avoid establishing a precedent. 
94statement of Abram Chayes in The Inter-American Security System 
And The Cuban Crisis, Lyman M. Tondel, Jr., Editor (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 
ocea.na-Publications, Incl, 1964) P• 39. 
95Abel, .2£• .2!i•, P• 115. 
96rbict., p. 105. 
CHAPTER III 
CUBA QUARANTINED 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the events during the 
quarantine phase of the crisis. This description is relevant to the 
analysis of the way the United States justified its case because it 
contains the data for comparing the perceptions of the EXCOM with what 
actually occurred. If the objective was achieved differently from the 
way planned, we are interested in l.alowing why. Also, the information 
which f ollo\'lS contains the operational evidence for making a judgment 
on legal validity of the quarantine. 
I. ULTIMATUM, APPROVAL AND DEBATE 
President Kennedy's Address 
On 22 October, after notifying allies and bringing the armed 
forces up to a full state of readiness, President Kenne9Y addressed the 
people of the United States in an atmosphere of crisis. He announced 
that the United States had unmistakeable evidence that the Soviet Union 
was in the process of installing a series of medium range ballistic 
missiles (MR.BM) and intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) sites 
in Cuba. That "the purpose of thes? bases could be none other than to 
provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere" 
which constituted "an explicit threat to all the Americas in flagrant 
and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of 
.this Nation and hemisphere, the joint resolution of the 87th Congress, 
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the Charter of the United Nations, 11 and his own public warnings to the 
Soviets of September 4 and 13. That this action was contrary to the 
repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen "that the arms buildup in Cuba 
would retain its original defensive character." That the "secret, swift, 
and extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles" was "deliberately pro-
vocative and unjustified change in the status quo" which could not be 
accepted by this country. Acting "in defense of our own security and of 
the entire Western Hemisphere," he stated that a strict quarantine on all 
offensive military equipment was being initiated, and that "all ships of 
any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation or port "would if they were 
found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons•i be turned back." That 
should the offensive military preparations continue, "further action 
would be justified." That the United States was calling for an immediate 
meeting of the OAS to consider "this threat to hemispheric security and 
to invoke articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty in support of all necessary 
action." That under the Charter of the United Nations, the United States 
was asking for an "emergency meeting of the Security Council be convoked 
without delay to take action against this latest Soviet threat to world 
peace." And, that the nation was prepared to present its case in any 
forum "without limiting our own freedom. of action. 11 97 
97For the text of Pres. Kennedy's address see The Dept. Of State 
Bull., Vol. XLVII (Nov 12, 1962), 715 •. Also, some writers have seen an 
inconsistency in the President's statement. Professor Mallison in compar-
ing Abram Chayes later statement that "the President in his speech did not 
invoke article 51 or the right of self defense" sees an apparent inconsis-
tency between Mr. Chayes statement and the words of the President by noting 
that since express approval at this time had not been given by the OAS, the 
President's intentions must have been to impose the quarantine pursuant to 
self defense alone. Professor ?.fallison•s assertion in absence of an explana-
tion is warranted. That was one of the reasons for analysing Article 51 
in Ch. II. It is believed that now the inconsistency is at least understand-
able. Ref: w. T. Ma.llison "Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine Interdiction: 
National and Collective Defense Claims Valid under International Law, 11 The 
George Washington Law Review, Vol. 31 (Oct 1962), 353 at footnote 90; aiid 
Abram Chayes, "TheLegal Case for u.s. Action in Cuba, 11 .'!h2 Dept • .2£ State 
~., Vol. XI.VII (Nov. 191 1962) 1 764 • 
~~~--------------------------------------------.mi 
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11!.2 Hcsults of !:.!!2. Mcetin& ££ ~ Organization ££ American Statca 
On Tuesday morning, October 23, Secretary Rusk was in the United 
States' chair at the OAS hoping by his personal participation to better 
Edwin Martin's estimate that with luck the quarantine would get 14 approv-
ing votes, the ·bare minimum required.98 Two draft resolutions were 
submitted. The first was a procedural resolution by which the Council 
would decide to convoke the Organ of Consultation under the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) and would also 
decide to act provisionally as that Organ in accordance with Article 1299 
of that treaty. Under the second resolution, the Organ of Consultation 
would call for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all 
missiles and other weapons of offensive capability and would recommend, 
though not seek to compel, the member states of the OAS to take the 
measures necessary to insure that the buildup did not continue to receive 
additional offensive weapons, and to prevent the offensive capacity 
already acquired by the Castro regime from being used to destroy the 
peace and the security of the hemisphera.100 
98Abel, .21?• cit., p. 128. 
99.Article 12 states that: 11The Governing Board of the Pan American 
Union may act provisionally as an organ of consultation until the meeting 
of the Qraan of Consultation referred to in the preceeding Article takes 
place. 11 The "preceeding Article ref erred to" is Article 11 which provides 
that "the consultations to which this Treaty refers shall be carried out 
by means of the Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American 
Republics which have ratified the Treaty, or in the manner or by the organ 
which in the future may be agreed upon. 11 
100Excract from statement made by Secretary Rusk at a special 
meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States on October 23, 
1962. For text see The Department 2.£. State Bulletin, Vol. XLVII, (Nov 12, 




The first resolution was quickly adopted, and as the second was 
considered, the delegates of countries that had long opposed any action 
against Cuba took the floor one by ono to announce their support for the 
resolution; however, there were some reservations. In the section-by-
section vote that followed, Brazil, Mexico, and Boliva, abstained on the 
second part of paragraph two relating to the use of armed force "to pre-
vent the missiles with offensive capability existing in Cuba from being 
converted at any time into an active threat to the peace and security of 
the continent." These countries felt that this wording might be committing 
them to support an invasion of Cuba without a prior specification of the 
respective measures.101 Nevertheless, by a vote of 19 to 0 with 1 absten-
tion, the resolution was adopted. (Uruguay abstained on October 23 
because its delegate had not received instructions from his government; 
on October 24 Uruguay cast an affirmative vote making approval of the 
resolution unanimous).102 
The operative clause of the resolution read as follows: 
The Council of the Organization of American States Meeting as the 
Provisional Organ of Consultation, resolves: 
1. To call for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba 
of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability; 
2. To recommend that the member states, in accordance with Articles 
6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all 
measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed 
force which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba 
cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material 
and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the 
Continent and to prevent the mi~siles in Cuba with offensive capability 
lOlrnter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Applications, 
Vol0 II, (1960-1964)(hereinafter called Applications), P• 109. 
102The Department 2! ~ Bulletin, Vol. XLVII (Nov. 12, 1962), 722. 
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from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the 
Continent; 
J. To inform the Security Council of the United Nations of this 
resolution in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United 
Nations and to express the hope that the Security Council will in 
accordance with the draft resolution introduced by the United States, 
dispatch United Nations observers to Cuba at the earliest moment. 
4. To _continue to serve provisionally as Organ of Consultation 
and to request the Member States to keep the Organ of Consultation 
duly informed of measures taken by them in accordance with paragraph 
two of this resolution.103 
By October 29, Argentina, Columbia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Panama had all sont notea offering the 
cooperation of air and naval forces, port facilities, and other inatalla-
tions needed to carry out the collective action contemplated.l04 Thus, 
in the greatest display of Western Hemisphere solidarity since the days 
of World War II, and after several years of United States attempts at 
persuasion had failed, the threat of nuclear weapons in Cuba had quickly 
produced unity. 
Ted Szulc, covering the conference for The New York Ti.Iiles, 
reported that 11the Administration feels that the display of this hemi-
sphere solidarity will not merely strengthen the United States position 
' 
I 
in the United Nations, it may also impose caution on the Russians because 
they may not wish to incur the open hostility of a region that they have 
been acti:V'ely courting for years. ul05 Whether this prediction was correct, 1 
would soon be seen; but there is no doubt that the action of the OAS, 
together with the show of support f~om the NATO allies, left the Russians 
with no hppe of splitting the Western camp. 
l03Ibid., p. 723. 
104Applications, £E• ~., P• 148. 
105The New York Times, October 24, 1962 
----
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Debate ~ the United Nations 
During the evening of October 22, Ambassador Stevenson, submitted 
the United States request for convening of the Security Counci1106 to 
which was attached a draft resolution.107 The letter was important for 
two reasons: First,it made clear that the United States was in its 
declaration of intent to impose the quarantine giving effect to prior 
OAS determinations: 
In order to give effect to the determination of the countries 
of the Western hemisphere which they have recently reaffirmed to 
safeguard and def end the peace and security of the regime against 
external interference and aggression, the United States is initiat-
ing a strict quarantine of Cuba •••• 11108 
Second, the letter also referred to the need for 11immediate 11 Security 
Co~cil action, and proposed "the prompt and effective discharge" of the 
Council's responsibility. Two pertinent issues came to mind here; one 
that has been raised by Quincy Wright; and another which this paper has 
raised. Both require a reply. 
Quincy Wright has found fault with the United States case between 
October 22-23, by asserting that the President's declaration to implement 
the quarantine was: (1) unilateral because OAS approval had not been 
given at that time; and (2) inhibiting on the OAS 1s _judgment in 
106UN Security Council Doc. S/5181, ~ Department E.f State 
BuJ.letin, Vol. XI.VII (Nov 12, 1962), 724. 
107UN Security Council Doc. S/5182, ~ Department of State 
Bulletin, Vol. XI.VII (Nov 12, 1962), 724. 
lOSA reaffirmation such as that alluded to in the quoted excerpt 
was contained in the final communique issued at the conclusion of an 
informal meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, 
at Washington, D.C., Oct. 2-3, 1962, .2.E• .£!!!., PP• 598-600. 
considering the proposed resolution by presenting it with a verbal 
fiat accomuli.109 As the above letter by Ambassador Stevenson makes 
clear, the United States was already acting in accordance with previous 
agreements. On the subject of inhibiting the OAS, it is believed that 
sufficient evidence has already been presented to establish that proud, 
independent minded Latin Americans are hardly susceptible to this kind 
of psychological constraint. 
The socond issue concerns the question whether Ambassador 
Stevenson's remarks constitute a contradiction of what was said in 
Chapter II concerning reliance on the United Nations? Put another way, 
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if this paper is correct, were his remarks mere cant? The answer to both 
questions is no, because his actions represented a precedural step to 
realize the other benefits available in the United Nations. Meaning, as 
Richard N. Gardner has stated: "The Cuban crisis was a particularly eloquent 
illustration of the United Nations threefold value to the United States 
as a place for debate, negotiation and action •••• 110 All this, in 
spite of no solution. 
On October 23, the Security Council met to consider the crisis. 
Two draft resolutions, one American and the other Russian were laid 
before the Council. The American resolution asked for the immediate 
withdrawal of the offensive weapons, under international inspection 
109vlright, .£E• cit., pp. 557-558. 
llORichard N. Gardner, "The United Nations in Crisis: Cuba 
and the Congo, 11 The Department of~ Bulletin, Vol. XI.VII 
(April 8, 1963), 477. 
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to be followed by lifting of the blockade, and for negotiations between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. The Russian co\ll'lter proposal 
condemned the blockade, asked for its immediate termination, and specified 
negotiations between the United States, the u.s.S.R., and Cuba for 
restoration of normalcy.111 
In the debate that followed, both sides filed complaints that 
the other had violated Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. 
Ambassador Stevenson explicitly placed the charge directly under the 
article when he stated that "the installation of nuclear weapons by 
stealth,, weapons of mass destruction in Cuba poses a dangerous threat to 
peace, a threat which contravenes article 2, paragraph 4 .• 
• • 
nll2 
The allegations made against the United States by the Soviet delegate, 
Valerian A. Zorin, were not as explicitly set out as in the case of the 
United States. In their initial call for a convening of the Security 
Council they asked for an examination of the question of "violation of 
the Charter of the United Nations and threat to peace on the part of 
United States of America. nll3 Again, in their opening remarks in the 
Security Council they declared that "the institution by the United States 
of a virtual blockade of Cuban shores is a provocative act, an unpre-
cedented violation of international law •••• 114 And in their draft 
lllu.N. Security Council Doc. S/5187, October 23, 1962, P• 1 
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics draft resolution). 
' ll2The Department of State Bullei;in, Vol. XI.VII (Nov. 12~ 1960), 
p. 737 (Ambassador Stevenson"'i'"Sfirst statement of Oct. 25, 196JJ. 
113u.N. Security Council Doc. S/5186, Oc~. 23, 19~2~ P• 1 
(Letter addressed to the President of the Security Council). 
114u.N. Security Council Document S/5186, Oct. 23, 1962, pp. 2-7 
(Statement by the Soviet Government on Cuba). 
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resolution of 23 October they called for the Security Council to 11condomn 
the actions of the Government of the United States of America amied at 
violating the United Nations Charter and at increasing the threat of 
war. 11ll5 In essence, the Russians complaint amounted to a charge that 
the blockade constituted a threat of the use of force against their 
political independence to navigate on the high seas. And, to back up 
their charge, they chose an old fa'Ililiar theme~enforcement action. 
Ambassador Zorin, addressing the Security Council on 23 October phrased 
the nature of the additional charge a:J follows: 
In stating its intention to draw into the implantation of 
its aggressive actions against Cuba the Organization of American 
States--to which it is already dictating the effecting of collective 
sanctions against Cuba--the United States is openly violating the 
perogatives of the Security Council which alone can offer powers 
for the carrying out of any enforcement measures.116 
The Legal Adviser's Office of the Department of State had on 22 October 
correctly anticipated that the issue would be raised and were prepared 
to refute the charge.117 
The Soviet tactic in prosecuting their argument was relatively 
simple. They.·.would discredit the manner in which the United States had 
reacted to the alleged threat, hoping thereby to cut the ground out 
from under the justification given by Ambassador Stevenson. If the 
115union of Soviet Socialist Republics draft resolution, loc. cit. 
116u.N. Security Council Document S/P~, 1022, O~tober 23, 1?62, 
p. (Statement by Soviet Ambassador Valerian A. Zorin to the United 
Nations Security Council). 
117Excerpts from a memorandum prepared in the Legal Adviser's 
Office of the Department of State on Oct. 2~, 1962? entitled "Legal . 
Basis for the Quarantine in Cuba" and destributed informally. Quoted in 
Abram Chayes, et. al., ~International Legal Process, Vol. III, 
(Unpublished, 1967~PP• 58-59. 
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maneuver proved successful, the United States would be left defenseless, 
and would be b!t!.a.nded the aggressor. Ambassador Zorin relied heavily on 
the official statements which iris government had previously issued 
giving assurances that the arms shipments to Cuba were solely for 
"defensive" purposes. He intimated that the United States had acted 
like a diplomatic "outlaw" for failing to present its evidence to 
Mr. A. A. Gromyko when he met with the President on 18 October, and he 
drew on the statments of Walter.Lippmann to illustrate his point.118 
The frust of the argmnent was that there was no such evidence. The 
outcome of this maneuver is well known. In a dramatic scene, Ambassador 
Stevenson ended all controversy as to whether the missiles were really 
there; and, also, ended all debate.ll9 Subsequently, on 25 October, by 
conunon consent, the Security Council adjourned to permit diplomacy to 
work out a solution. No vote was ever taken on any resolution, but the 
United Nations had served its purpose in this case. Ambassador Stevenson's 
classic presentation had marshalled world opinion in favor of the United 
States as no other forum had ever done before. 
II. IMPLEMENTATION AND SUCCESS 
The Interdiction Proclamation 
On the evening of October 23, after the action of the OAS, 
President Kennedy proclaimed the q~arantine to take effect the 
118waiter Lippmann had been critical of the President•s action at 
this meeting. He stated that the President in failing to present the 
evidence had suspended diplomacy. 
119u.N. Security Council Official Records, 17th Year, 1025th 
meeting, 1-17 (s/5171). 
. I 
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following day. It read in part: 
For the purposes of this proclamation the following are 
declared to be prohibited materiel: , 
Surface-to-surface missiles; bomber aircraft· bombs· air-to-
surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads f~r any ~f the above 
weapons; m~chanical or electronic equipment to support or operate 
the above items and any other classes of materiel hereinafter des-
ignated by tre Secretary of Defense for the purpose of effectuating 
this Proclamation. 
The Secretary of Defense may make such regulations and issue such 
directives as he deems necessary to ensure tm effectiveness of this 
order, including tre designation, within a reasonable distance of 
Cuba, of prohibited or restricted zones and of prescribed routes. 
Any vessel or craft which may be proceeding toward Cuba may be 
intercepted and may be directed to identify itself, its cargo, 
equipment and stores and its ports of call, to stop, to lie to, to 
submit to visit and search, or to proceed as directed. Any vessel 
or craft which fails or refuses to respond to or comply with directions 
shall be subject to being taken into custody. Any vessel or craft 
which it is believed is enroute to Cuba and may be carrying prohibited 
materiel or may itself constitute such materiel shall, wherever 
possible, be directed to proceed to anotrer destination of its own 
choice and shall be taken into custody if it fails or refuses to 
obey such instructions. 
In carrying out this order, force shall not be used except in 
case of failure or refusal to comply with directions, or with regu-
lations or directives of the Secretary of Defense issued hereunder, 
after reasonable efforts have been made to communicate tram to the 
vessel or craft, or in case of self defense120In any case, force 
shall be used only to tm extent necessary. 
Composition of the Quarantine Force 
By agreement among the participating governments of the OAS, a 
ccm.bined force was established as the 11 Combined Quarantine Force 11 under 
the operational conmand of Rear Admiral John A. Tyree Jr., USN. Under 
120rnterdiction Proclamation, !2£• ill• 
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this arrangement, officers of the participating navies acted as members 
of the Staff of the Combined Quarantine Force, and the respective naval 
units were integrated in that force.121 
Controlling the Risks 
When the Interdiction Proclamation went into effect there were 
nineteen United States ships on station located on an arc 500 miles 
distant from Cape Maysi, Cuba's eastern most tip. Tho distance had boon 
selected by Navy planners so that the line of ships would be beyond the 
range of MIG fighter aircraft based in Cuba.122 
Secretary of Defense McNamara announced on 23 October, that United 
States patrol planes had spotted 25 Soviet merchant ships on their way 
to Cuba, and that their courses had remained unchanged in the last 24 
hours. The Secretary also announced that he had sent orders to the Navy, 
issued ten minutes after President Kennedy's proclamation, which contained 
instructions to sink if necessary, any vessels that refused to comply 
with the terms of the quarantine, which the Secretary said, were that the 
ships must either turn away from Cuban ports, submit to search and seizure 
if they intended to reach Cuba, and obey orders to alter their desti-
nations if they were carrying offensive weapons.123· 
\ 
121Applications, .2E• cit., p. 154. 
122Abel, .2£• cit., p. 141. 
123The New York Times, October 24, 1962. 
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On Wednesday, 24 October the Acting Secretary General of the 
United Nations, U. Thant, sent identical messages to President Kennedy 
and Chairman Khrushchev asking for "the voluntary suspension of all 
arms shipments to Cuba, and also the voluntary suspension of the 
quarantine measures ••• for a period of .two or three weeks. 11124 
The purpose of the suspension was to "give time to the parties con-
cerned to meet and discuss with a view to finding a peaceful solution 
to the problem. 11125 Khruschev's reply was brief and affirmative.126 
Kennedy, however, was anything but grateful for the intervention. If 
U Thant's proposed negotiations were to fail, once the machinery had 
been disconnected, it might be impossible to start it running again.127 
His reply reflected that while the United States was willing to talk, 
the quarantine would continue.128 At about noon on that same day, 
Secretary McNamara said the Soviet ship nearest Cuba should make 
contact "With the quarantine force at about 7:30 P.M. But later that 
124Statement by Acting Secretary General U Thant to United 
States Security Council, including text of letter to President Kennedy 
and Chairman Khrushchev, October 24, 1962. U.N. ~ Release SG/1353, 
October 24, 1962, pp. 1-3. 
125~. 
l26Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to Acting Secretary General 
u Thant, October 25, 1962. The~ York~' October 26, 1962, p. ·16. 
127Abel, .2.E• £1!•, p. 150., 
1281etter from President Kennedy to Acting Secretary General 
U Thant, October 25, 1962, ~ Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLVII, 
(November 12, 1962), 740. 
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afternoon, came the first indication of a break. Some of the Soviet 
dry cargo ships heading towards Cuba, including five big-hatch ships, 
had apparently altered course .. and the rest were stopped dead in the 
water waiting further instructions. The President. was determined to 
pace events. He had issued. orders that the.re was to be no shooting, 
and that the Soviet ships were to be kept in view but none was to be 
boarded without his express approvai.129 Thus the first day of the 
quarantine ended with no contact at sea. 
At 8 A.M., Thursday morning, October 25th, twenty-two hours 
after the imposition of the quarantine; a Navy ship made the first 
interception of a Soviet ship. The oil tanker BUCHAREST was hailed 
and then waved on without search because the Navy was satisfied it 
carried only petroleum.130 Back at the United Nations the replies to 
U Thant's first appeal had barely been received in New York when the 
Acting Secretary General issued a second appea1. At 2:26 P.M., he 
called on both sides to avoid a direct confrontation at sea for a 
limited time only "in order to permit discussions of the modalities 
of a possible agreement which could settle the problem peacefully in 
line with the Charter of the United Nations. 11131 To Khrushchev, 
U Thant appealed for instructions to Soviet ships already on their 
129Hilsman, .2.E• cit., P• ~5· 
130The New York Times, "Cuban Crisis: A Step by Step Review," 
November 3, 1962, pp. l,t;::f; 
131Phrase contained in both letters. 
... 
way to Cuba to "stay away from the interception area, 11132 and to 
President Kennedy. he asked that instruction be issued to United States 
vessels in the Caribbean "to do everything possible to avoid direct 
confrontation with the Soviet ships in the next few days to avoid any 
untoward incident. 11133 Both Khrushchev and Kennedy accepted the 
proposal.134 But as we have seen, both men had already implemented 
similar instructions on Wednesday. 
Just before 8 A.M., Friday, October 26th, the first and last 
boarding of quarantine was executed. The ~ MAIWCLA, .a freighter 
registered under the Lebanese flag, out of the Bal:ti.c port of Riga, 
and under Soviet charter, was intercepted by the destroyers lQ!:!!:! ]:. 
PIERCE and JOSEPH f• KENNEDY, JR.. The boarding party found no 
contraband, and the MARUCLA, after quietly submitting to the inspec-
tion, was permitted to proceect.135 This encounter had been planned 
with meticulous care by the President himself. Acting on Uewellyn 
Thompson's advise that nothing would be gained by a gratuitous affront 
132Letter from Acting Secretary General U Thant to Chairman 
Khrushchev, October 25, 1962. U.N. ~ Release SG/1357, October 26, 
1962, pp. 1-2. 
1331etter from Acting Secretary General U Thant to President 
Kennedy, October 25, 1962. U.N. ~ Release SG/1358, October 26, 
1962, pp. 1-2. 
1341etter from President Kennedy to Acting Secretary General 
U Thant, October 25, 1962. U'.'N,.f ~ Release SG/135~, October 26, 
1962, pp. 2-3; Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to Acting Secretary 
General U Thant, October 25, 1962. Q•!!• ~Release _SG/1357, 
October 26, 1962, pp. 2-3. 




to. Khrushchev' the President had issued detailed instructions. He 
wanted Khrushchev to know that the United States Navy had exercised the 
right claimed in his interdiction proclamation, to stop and search all 
.vessels bound for Cuba, regardless of national registry.136 Now the 
crucial question became, how soon would the Soviet missiles become 
operational? 
In a series of both public and private announcements, Washington 
let Moscow know it would not wait forever. At a regular noon briefing, 
the State Department spokesman, Lincoln White, called attention to the 
sentence in the President 1s speech that further action would be 
justified. Pierre Salinger called a White House conference and gave 
the reporters a statement that development of the ballistic missile 
sites in Cuba was continuing at a rapid pace. And Robert Kennedy 
passed the word to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin that the President 
could not hold off more than two days longer .137 The .first signs of 
a reaction occurred at 1:30 P.M. Friday afternoon. 
John Scali, diplomatic correspondent of the American Broad-
casting Company, was sitting in his pressroom cubicle in the State 
Department when the telephone rang. The caller was a Russian named 
Alexander s. Fomin: who was listed in the diplomatic bluebook as one 
of the several Soviet Embassy counselors, but who .American security 
considered to be the chief of Sovie~ intelligence in the United States. 
He urged Scali to meet him and then outlined a startling proposal. 
\ 
136Abel on. cit., P• 172 
' .:;.i; -
l37rbid., PP• 173-174. 
Would the State Department be interested in settling tho crisis on 
these terms: the Soviet Union would agree to remove the missiles and 
the United States would pledge itself not to invade Cuba. Scali 
I 
replied that he could not speak for the United States but he carried , 
the message to Roger Hilsman, the State Department intelligence chief. 
Hilsman passed the offer to Secretary Rusk who called the White House. 
Rusk then prepared a brief reply which Elie Abel says read as follows: 
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I have reason to believe that the United States Government sees 
possibilities in this and supposes that representatives of the two 
governments could work this matter out with U Thant and with each 
other. My impression is, however, that time is very urgent.138 
The message was delivered to Fomin, and about the time Scali returned 
to the State Department the teletype started chattering Khrushchev's 
first offer of settlement. It was 6 P.M. Friday.139 
The text of Khrushchev's letter to President Kennedy of 
26 October has never been published. The terms closely paralled:~ 
Fomin's offer, but not exactly. Elie Abel tells us that in the letter 
Khrushchev proposed that if the President would give assurances not 
to attack Cuba, then there would be no further need to keep Soviet 
military specialists in Cuba.140 The EXCOM considered the letter ~ 
until late that night, but no decision was made on a·reply.141 
on Saturday, October 27th, matters turned for the worst. 
138~., P• 177. 
\ 139Ibid. 
l40Ibid., p. 181. 
l41Ibid., pp. 181-184. 
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A second offer of settlement was received from Moscow, but this time 
the ante had been raised. In a tone less conciliatory than the first 
message, Khrushchev was demanding removal of United·states missiles in 
Turkey. in exchange for removal of Russian missiles from Cuba.142 
The quid pro guo w~s unacceptable, and in the official reply the White 
House declared: 
It is therefore the position of the United States that as an 
urgent preliminary to consideration of any proposals, work on the 
Cuban bases must stop; offensive weapons must be rendered in-
operable; and further shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba must 
cease--all under effective international verification.143 
Then the EX.COM tried a diplomatic gamble. Ignoring Khrushchev's 
second letter, it drafted aIL'Of'.f~r to Moscow which reflected the pro-
posals made in the Scali-Fomin conversation and Khrushchev's first 
letter. The nassage was published and delivered to the Russian's at 
about 7 P.M., that evening. In this letter President Kennedy said: 
As I read your letter, the key elements of your pnoposals--
which seem generally acceptable as I understand them--are as 
follows: 
(1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from 
Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; 
and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further 
introduction of such weapons into Cuba. 
(2) We, on our part, would agree--upon the establishment of 
adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the 
carrying out and continuation of these COMMITMENTS--(a) to remove 
promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give 
assurances against an invasion of Cuba. I am confident that 
other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do 
likewise. 
But the first ingredient, ~et me emphasize, is the cessation 
1421etter from Chairman Khrushchev to President.Kennedy, 
October 27, 1962. The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLVII 
(November 12, 1962), 741-743. . 
14.3vfuite House Statement on Soviet Proposals, October 27, 




of work an missile sites in Cuba and measures to render such wea-
pons inoperable, under effective international guarantees.144 
The next day Khrushchev agreed to the terms of settlement and the 
crisis was over.145 
Summary 
The quarantine proved to be"considerably more successful 
than had been anticipated. The surprising support given to the United 
States by the Latin American members of the OAS may very well have 
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reflected a vote against Castro as well as a vote for the United States. 
With their strong sense of traditional kinship based on personal trust 
and confidence, the Latin American's must have felt betrayed by Castro's 
action. To invite the Soviet Union to establish a threat to their 
security was the ultimate in treachery. The role that the United 
Nations played in the crisis was also greater. As a place for debate, 
the rhetorical skill of Adlai Stevenson scored a dramatic victory for 
the United States. As a place for negotiation, the Acting Secretary 
General proved to be a useful go-between. While the evidence does 
not support Richard N. Gardner's claim that U Thant's initiative 
·"helped avoid an armed clash at sea between the Soviets and ourselves; 11146. 
there is good reason to believe that U Thant's second message was to 
1441etter from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev, 
October 27, 1962. The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLVII 
(November 12, 1962), 743. 
145Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, 
October 28,, 1962~ The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLVII, 
(November 12, 1962), 743-745. 
146Richard N. Gardner, 11 The United Nations in Crisis; Cuba 
and the Congo, 11The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XI.VIII, 




some degree instrumental in freezing the situation while diplomacy took 
over. On this same point, it is recalled that the EXCOM had desired to 
obtain OAS approval in order to give the quarantine force an appear-
ance of legitimacy. This raises the question: How much influence did 
this factor exert on Khrushchev's decision not to challenge the line 
of ships? Probably not much. It seems unrealistic to assert that the 
action of turning away could be.interpreted as a "recognition by the 
Soviet Union of the legal validity of the quarantine. 11147 However, 
the blessings of the OAS possibly did convince the Soviet leaders that 
there was no hope of bringing moral pressure to bear on the United 
States. In the Soviet decision on how to deal with the quarantine, 
Mr. Arnold L. Horelick of the Rand Corporation provides a very cogent 
sununarization: 
The Soviet leaders essentially had three choices, all of them 
unpleasant, and one of them quite dangerous: 
(1) They could submit to the quarantine by permitting their 
vessels to be stopped, searched, and if they carried contraband, / 
to be siezed; or 
(2) they could avoid a showdown by keeping their ships out 
of the quarantine area~which, with the exception of an oil tanker 
· clearly identifiable as such, is what they actually did; or 
(3) they could precipitate the use of violence by attempting 
to violate the quarantine, perhaps with the aid of submarines. 
Soviet prospects for success in such an undertaking were very poor; 
and the outlook could not have appeared any brighter to them at 
any of the successively higher local levels.148 
Finally, as a result of mutual concessions and compromises, an 
agreement was reached which made it possible to remove the tension and 
·147Mallison, .2.P• cit., p. 391. 
148Horelick, J2E.! cit., pp. 385-386. 
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to normalize the situation. Kennedy for his part perceived that 
Khrushchev would have to react to any attack on Cuba. As he later 
confided to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "If we had invaded Cuba ••• 
I am sure the Soviets would have acted. They would have to, just as 
we would have to. I think there are certain compulsions on any 
major power. 11149 Likewise, Khrushchev believed that if he did not 
remove the missiles, the United States would do so forcibly in which 
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case he would be faced with another set of equally undesirable alter-
natives: the loss of the only Communist state in the Western Hemisphere 
and the risk of general nuclear war.150 We can probably take at face 
value Khrushchev's statement of 12 December 1962 that "immediate 
action was required to prevent the attack on Cuba" when he "received 
information from Cuban comrades and from other sources on the morning 
of October 27 directly stating that this attack would be carried out 
in two or three days. 11151 On October 28, his message of acceptance was 
_r_e_ce_i_·v_e_d_. ____ l49schlesinger, ~· cit., p. 691. 
l50In regard to the role played by the danger of general/ war 
in Khrushchev's decision to withdraw Soviet strategic weapons from Cuba, 
Secretary McNamara testified before a subcommittee of the House Committee 
on Appropriations in February 1963: "• •• we had a force of several 
· hundred thousand men ready to invade Cuba ••.• had we invaded Cuba, we 
could have been confronted with the Soviets • • • had we been confronted 
with the Soviets we would have killed thousands of them • • • had we 
killed thousands of them the Soviets would probably have had to respond 
••• they might have had nuclear delivery weapons there that might have 
been operational and they might have been launched ••• in any·event, 
Khrushchev knew without any questi~n whatever that he faced the full 
military power of the United States, including its nuclear weapons ••• 
we faced that night the possibility of launching nuclear weapons and 
Khrushchev knew it, and that is the reason, and the only reason, why 
he withdrew those weapons." p. Jl. 
15111The Present International Situation and the foreign policy 
of the Soviet Union." Report by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev at Session of 
U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet Dec. 12, 1962 (Pravda, Dec 13, pp. 1-5; 
Izvestia, pp. 1-4). The Current Digest .2f. ~Soviet Press, Vol. ·.xrv, 




The purpose of this chapter is to describe and analyze how 
the United States legal spokesmen attempted to bring the quarantine 
into conformity with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. 
I. BYPASSING ARTICLE 53(1) 
.TI.!£ Problem with Article 53(1) 
If it is assumed that the quarantine was enforcement action, the 
principal problem that Article 53(1) presented to the United States legal 
case was that the Security Council never expressly authorized the quaran-
tine prior to its execution. Under these circumstances, the quarantine 
amounted to a prima facie violation of the United Nations Charter. 
Article 53(1) is a part of Chapter VIII of the United Nations 
Charter. Its purpose, when read in conjunction with the other provisions 
152 
- of the same chapter, especially Article 52(1), is to control the use 
·of coercive force by regional agencies. This is accomplished by the 
requirement that Security Council.authorization must.be obtained prior 
to taking any enforcement actiono As viewed from the regional agency, 
152Article 52(1) states: "Nothing in the present Charter precludes 
the existance of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such 
matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security 
as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements 
or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and 
Principles of the United Nations." 
! 
/ 
Article 53(1) is a switch with the Security Council in control of the 
lever. Until approval is given, enforcement action is theoretically 
prohibited. 
~ Tactics Employed to Bypass Article 53(1) 
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To eliminate the above described difficulty and thereby bring the 
quarantine into conformity with Chapter VIII of the Charter, the United 
States legal spokesmen chose to attack the concept of Article 53(1) in 
two ways: First, they argued that even though authorization might be 
required, it need not be given prior to execution, nor explicitly expressed. 
If these two points were conceded, then it could be claimed that there 
was Security Council authorization. Second, they contended that Security 
Council authorization was not required in any case, since the quarantine 
was not enforcement action. In other words, these two lines of argument 
amounted to saying that authorization was not required, but. that just in 
case it might be, it could be given after the fact. 
The official version of the argument was presented by Leonard 
c. Meeker2 Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State. 
Argument that Prior Approval is not Required. 11It should not be 
assumed that •authorizations of the Securi.ty Council' automatically 
and necessarily means prior authorization, 11153 Mr. Meeker argued. 
Citing a 1960 case in which on Sovie~ request the Security Council 
had met to.consider economic and diplomatic measures voted against 
\ 




the Dominican Republic by the OAS,154 he drew attention to the fact that 
"the U.S.S.R. had asked the Council to approve these measures after 
._..they had been taken. 11155 "The Soviet theory, 11 he went on to say, "quite 
evidently was that the Council could appropriately give its •author-
izations• after the fact.11156 
Critique. The first thing striking about the above argument 
is that since the measures discussed did not involve the use of force, 
its relevancy to the quarantine is not inunediately apparent; moreover, 
a close examination of the case cited by Mr. Meeker is revealing. 
The objective of the Soviet delegate was to graciously give on one 
hand while taking away with the other in an effort to collar the 
regional organization. The United States representativ.e, ~fr. James 
Wadsworth, saw the true intent of the Soviet delegate's move and 
vigorously resisted the efforts to bring the Soviet resolution to 
a vote, stating that: 
It is significant that no member of the Organization of Ameri- I 
can States sought authorization from the Security council, 
under Article 53, for the steps taken in connection with that 
resolution and that, in specifically deciding that the resolution 
should be transmitted to the Security Council, only for its 
full information, the Foreign ~Iinisters were clearly express-
ing their view that this action required only notification to 
the United Nations under Article 54.157 _ 
Following this, the United States joined with other members of the OAS 
sitting on the Security Council, Argentina and Ecuador, and sponsored 
154See U.N. Security Council, Official Records, 893rd Meeting, 
Po 2ff. (Sept. 8, 1960). (Hereinafter referred to as Dominican Case, 
1960). 
155i{eeker, loc. cit. 
156rbid. 
157Dominican Case, lac. cit. 
their own draft resolution. This is the resolution that was finally 
passed: 
The Security Council, 
Having received the report from the Secretary General of the 
Organization of American States transmitting the Final Act of the 
Sixth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
for the American States (S/4476) 
Takes note of that report and especially of resolution I, approved 
at the aforesaid meeting whereby agreement was reached on the 
application of measures regarding the Dominican Republic.158 
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Recalling that Mr. Meeker inferred that the above case had established a 
precedent which could be used to claim that prior authorization was no longer 
required, it is apparent that this was not the conclusion of Security 
Council. The Soviet 11theory, 11 as Mr. Meeker calls it, was defeated, and no 
such precedent was established. 
Argument that i!Jxpress Approval is not Required. In support 
of the contention that express approval was not necessary, Mr. Meeker 
called attention to the fact_that during the missile crisis the Security 
I Council was deadlocked~ Arguing that 11if in the past the abstention or even 
the absence of a permanent Member from the Council has been held suf f icent 
to supply the concuring votes of the permanent Members• ••• might it not 
equally be thought that the Council's course of action ••• could constitute 
such authorization, 11159 since 11the Council let the quarantine continue 
rather than supplant it 11l60 while the parties negotiated, he concluded 
that "authorization may be said to have been granted by the course which 
I 
the Council adopted.11161 
158Ibid. 
159Meeker, .22• cit., p~ 522. 
16orbid. 
16lrbid. 
Critique. Apart from the fact that no vote was taken on any 
resolution, and no one was absent, the weakness of the above argument 
is in the word 11let. 11 The Security Council did not "let" anything 
happen--it could not have done otherwise. Tacit approval, always a 
hazard to the party assuming it, can at best only be relied upon when 
the authorizing agency has discretionary powers, and then chooses to 
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do nothing. In this instance, the Security Council had no such discre-
tion, and if the matter had been pressed, it would have been defeated. 
Arg.ument that the Quarantine~ not Enforcement Action. In 
support of this argument Mr. Meeker attempted to use two previous 
decisions of the Security Council and an advisory opinion of the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ). The first of these was the Dominican 
case cited above. With reference to this case he said, 11The upshot 
of the Security Council debate • • • was that the Council rejected the 
Soviet contention that the measures in question constituted 'enforce-
ment action' requiring •authorization.• 11162 Next, he referred to the 
decision of the Council on a Cuban draft resolution requesting that the 
ICJ, among other things, render an advisory opinion whether 11the Organ-
· ization of American States have the right as a regional agency to take 
enforcement action •.•• without the authorization of the Security 
Counci1.11163 In this case, he said, 11The Council rejected the contention 
162
rbid., p. 520. 
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that the measures ••• required any authorization by the Council. 11164 
Lastly, he introduced an advisory opinion of the ICJ. He used this 
opinion to draw the analogy that since the ICJ had ruled that the measures 
taken by the General Assembly in the Suez and the Congo were not enforce-
ment action165 because "they were only recozmnendatory as to the participating 
states; 11166 it could likewise be said that the quarantine was not enforcement 
action since, similarly, the member states of the OAS had not been under 
any obligation to carry out the quarantine; concluding that 11as understood: 
by the United States, 'enforcement action• means obligatory action.11167 
Thus, the thrust of tl:e whole argument was, as has been suggested above, 
that Security Council authorization was not required. 
Critique. Mr. Meeker•s interpretation of the Dominican case has 
already been examined and found to be unpersuasive. Likewise, the second 
Security Council decision that he refers to is no more convincing. In 
this case, the voting was 7 for, 2 against, with the majority belonging 
to the Western bloc. It could be argued that this vote reflected a con-
cern to prevent the ICJ from taking up a highly political questioni however, 
the split in the vote seems to deny that suggestion. Whatever the true 
intent, the effect of the ruling precluded the ICJ from rendering a decision 
which might appear unfavorable to the OAS members of the voting bloc. 
Finally, with respect to the ICJ advisory opinion, Mr. Meeker•s logic 
164Meeker, loc. cit. 
165Advisory Opinion of the International Court of.Justic on 
"Certain Expenses of the United Nations," 20 July 1962 (ICJ Report 151). 
lb6Meeker, .21?.• cit., p. 521 
167Ibid. 
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transferring the court rs ruling to the missile crisis was also unsound. 
Recalling that Mr. Meeker would l:ikeus to believe that the advisory 
opinion provided grounds for claiming .. that enforcement action which is 
only recommendatory is not enforcement action, a careful reading of the 
opinion discloses that the circumstances being considered in that case 
were very different from the missile crisis. 
In the Suez and Congo the ICJ decided that a military force, properly 
authorized by the General Assembly or the Security Council, with the function 
of maintaining peace and security in a nation's territory, stationed there 
with the consent of the receiving state, not temporarily controlling the 
territory in which stationed, not authorized to take military action against 
any state, did not constitute enforcement action. The following extracts 
from the opinion are given in support of this interpretation: (1) as to 
function, consent, control, and action, the court found that: 
The functions of the United Nations Force would be • • • to 
enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian Govern-
ment, in order to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal 
of non-Egyptian troops, and to secure compliance with the other 
terms established in the resolution of 2 November 1956. 
The resolution, in the light of the appeal from the Government 
of the Congo, the report of the Secretary-General and the debate 
/ in the Security Council, was clearly adopted with a view to main-
taining international peace and security. 
It would be more than an observer's corps, but in no way a 
military force temporarily controlling the territory in which it 
is stationed; • • • • 
The armed forces which were utilized in the Congo wgre not 
authorized to take military action against any state.l 8 
16SICJ Report 151, ,2Eo cit. 
62 
(2) As to the authority for the General Assembly to act in this caso, the 
court held that even though 11 the kind of action ref erred to in Article 11, 
paragraph 2, is coercive or enforcement ation •••• ·the last sentence of 
Article 11, paragraph 2, has no application where the necessary action is 
not enforcement actionu169 because: 
If the word 'action' • • • were interpreted to mean that the 
General Assembly could make recommendations only of a general 
character affecting peace and security in the abstract, and not 
in relation to specific cases, the paragraph would not have 
provided that the General Assembly may make reconunendations on 170 questions brought before it by States or by the Security Council. 
This ruling meant that the General Assembly could not be disbarred from 
making recommendations for 11actiontt which were not equivalent to coercive 
or enforcement action. 
Comparing the foregoing with the facts of the missile crisis, it is 
difficult to understand how Mr. Meeker could have interpreted and applied 
the opinion in the manner in which he did. The provisions of Article 53(1) 
were not altered by this opinion, and as Mr. Windass illustrates, "a moments / 
reflection would show the absurdity of supposing it otherwise, it is un-
_ likely that the framers of Article 53 intended to say, •any kind of security 
action can be taken without Security Council support, provided it is all 
done voluntarily.• 11171 
169Ibid. 
Article 11(2) states: "The·General Assembly may discuss any 
questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security 
brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security 
Council, or by a State which is not a Member of the United Nations in 
accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 
12, may make reconunendations with regard to any such question to the State 
or States concerned or to the Security Council, or to both. Any such 
question on 1'.hich action is necessary shall be referred to the Security 
Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion." 
l70:rCJ Report 151, .212• ill• 
171 •t 9 Windass, .2E• ,E;_., p. 
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Rationalizing tho Bypass 
Having destroyed tha U.S. legal case, the onus is now on the 
author to find the u.s. guilty of violating some rule, or legally jus-
tified by some authority which has not been ma.de explicit. The choice 
involved is not a subjective one 0 .Judging by the evidence presented in 
this paper, the U.S. should have a perfectly legitimate case to agree 
with a morally right action. But it does not. What kind of approach 
then is needed to develop the authority, or at least make it obviously 
clear that were it not for the obstacle of Article 53(1), it would have 
such authority? One technique may be to derive the OAS 1 s authority 
through a series of questions and answers. 
(1) Where did the OAS derive its authority to approve the use of 
armed farce--meaning quarantine--in this case? Since in Article 1 of 
the Rio Treaty the High Contracting Parties "undertake in their interna-
tional relations not to resort to the threat or the use of force in any 
ma."nner inconsistent with the provisions· or the Charter of the United / 
Nations" the authority must derive from the U.N. Charter. 
(2) Does tha U.N. Charter expressly delegate to a regional organ-
ization the authority to use armed force? No, but it does provide that 
"All.Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any marmer inconsistent with the Purposes 
I 
of the United Nations "(Article 2(4)); and ·"The Purposes of the United 
Nations are: , ··l. To maintain international peace and security, and to 






and removal of threats to peace." (Article 1). Thus if an activity is 
designed to serve Purpose l, Article l, the use of armed force is not 
------
violative of Article 2(4). 
(3) The OAS can undertake activities in "self defense" as provided 
in Article 51 or for the "maintenance of international peace and security" 
in accordance with Article 52(1). Which did it do on this occasion? 
It chose to exercise its 52(1) authority since paragraph 3 of the 
Resolution of 23 October stated the intent to report in accordance with 
the requirements of Article 54 of the u.N. Charter. Article 54 (which 
is contained in the same chapter of the U.N. Charter as Article 52(1)) 
requires that the Security Council "shall at all times be kept fully in-
formed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional 
arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international 
peace and securityo11 
(4) What is left'Z Article 53(1) which states that "no enforcement 
action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies 
without authorization of the Security Councilo 11 Assuming for a moment 
that the quarantine is enforcement action, then the whole legal mechanism 
is derailed because Article 1 cannot be served until authorization is 
given by the Security Council as required by Article 53(1), but under 
these circumstances, the Security Council was deadlock. Therefore, is 
there justification for saying that were it not for the artificial pro-
visions of Article 53(1), the United States and the OAS would have had 
Article 1 authorization? The answer must be yes because the quarantine 
was designed to serve Purpose 1, Article l, of the United Nations Charter. 
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II. APPLICABILITY OF TRADITIONAL INTERNATIONAL IAW 
Traditional Blockade 
While the United States did not explicitly deny that the quarantine 
was a blockade in the .traditional sense, its representatives asserted as 
much by alluding to the fact that tre rules governing blockade were not 
applicable because: (l) "there was no assert.ion of a state of war or 
belligerency11172 'Which is implicit in the rules, and (2) that these rules 
were developed in the nineteenth century when the problems of interna-
tional order and state of weapons technology were totally different from 
today.173 These arguments are correct. Even a cursory examination of 
the rules of blockade174 will confirm that the object of these regula-
tions were to regulate the conduct of war. But war was clearly not the 
object herer as was evident from the choice of the word quarantine; as 
was evident from the decision to seek OAS authorization. Likewise, it 
cannot be asserted that the Soviets hove to voluntarily because they 
recognized the legality of a quasi-blockade. As has been pointed out, 
the stakes were much higher than just a couple of ships at sea or a 
principle of law, even though all of these influences may have played a 
role. Nevertheless, it simply seems unreal to believe that the Soviets 
acquiesced because they recognized the legality of the quarantine. 
Recognizing, as Mr. Chayes said, that "international law addresses differ-
ent problems today and in different context, 11175 it seems irrelevant to 
l7~eeker, .2E• cit., p. 515 
I 
l73Chayes, "The Legal Case for U.S. Action on Cuba, 11 .2E• cit., p. 763. 
l74neclaration Concerning the Laws of Naval Warfare, .2E• cit. 
175 . 
Chayes, 12£• ill• 
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to compare the rules of blockade with the characteristics of tho quaran-
tine bacause no conclusive statement could be derived from the exercise. 
One would find that there were many interesting similarities: appearances, 
effectiveness, promulgation, etc., yet, no reliable legal argument would 
be found in the rules ·of traditional blockade to sustain or attack the 
legality of the quarantine. 
Pacific Blockade 
Another concept in traditional international law is that of pacific 
blockade. This concept was not applicable in this case since pacific 
blockade is normally defined as a naval action taking place in peace-
time to bring pressure to bear against another nation by preventing the 
ships of the ::J6.j:>.::' <;. ii·. blockading and blockaded nation from entering 
or leaving specified areas of the blockaded nation's coast.176 Cuba was 
the blockaded nation but the quarantine was directed against.another State. 
III. APPLICABILITY OF OAS RESOLUTION TO THE 
SOVIET UNION 
Leonard Meeker•s cogent analysis of this question needs no elabor-
ation and may be quoted verbatim: 
The contention has sometimes been made that, while the quarantine 
of Cuba may have been lawful as between the United States and Cuba, 
it could not be legally effective as regards countries outside the 
American Republics, such as the u.s.s.R. To begin with, this conten-
tion involves an anomaly not readily to be accepted. It would have 
us conclude that the quarantine--an application of least force to 
the situation of clandestine strategic missiles in Cuba--was illegal 
in its application to Soviet shipping on the high seas (because the 
\ U0 S0 S.,.Ro was not bound by the Rio Treaty), while an air strike or 
invasion confined to the territory of Cuba would have been legally 
sanctioned. 
176John W0 Robertson, "Blockade to Quarantine in International 
Law,11 ~ JAG Journal, Vol. XVII, No. 4 (June 1963), pp. 87-90 · 
/ 
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But is such an assertion of illegality really sustainable as a 
proposition of international law? The Rio Treaty created a regional 
organization to maintain regional peace and security. If its 
purposes and activities are in confomity with the relevant provisions 
of the United Nations Charter, extra-hemispheric countries such as 
the u.s.s.Ro are not in a position to attack the organization's 
activities within the region0 177 
Summar;r 
The purpose of this chapter has been to describe and rationalize 
how the quarantine was brought into conformity with Chapter VIII of the 
U.N. Charter. That this had to be done was due to the provisions of 
Article 53(1). Because the quarantine had been executed without the 
Security Council's authorization, the U.S. legal spokesmen's argument 
was to prove that authorization could be given after the fact,. or was 
not applicable. These arguments were examined and found to be defective, 
and an alternative method of rationalizing the difficulty was presented 
and found to be sufficient for sustaining the legality of the quarantine. 
Matters of traditional international law were considered and found to be 
largely inapplicable. 





The purpose of this research paper was to analyze the United 
States justification for the Cuban quarantine to determine: (1) how it 
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was developed; (2) how well it sustained the legal validity of the 
quarantine;. and (3) what precedent, if any, it established in international 
law. 
The hypothesis of this paper was that the United States justified 
the quarantine as a regional peace keeping operation under OAS authoriza-
tion for the following series of reasons: (1) it was faced with an 
unprecedented threat to its security that required removal; (2) the 
removal could only be accomplished by the threat or use of force; (3) 
the United Nations could not have brought force to bear to relieve; 
(4) the United States could bring force to bear in the form of a quaran-
tine; (5) the United States desired to legitimize the use of force in 
order to improve the probability of acquiescence; (6) the United States 
also desired to avoid Article 51 as authority for the quarantine so as 
not to set a precedent. 
It is Believed that the results of this study has verified the 
hypothesis, and :fulfilled the purposes with the exception of precedents 
which will be discussed below. 
·\ The :following constitutes the major findings and resultant pre-
cedents which were determined from this research: 
•"'--.. 
69 
Legality of ~ Quarantine 
The analysis has shown the critical place that Article 53(1) 
occupied in deciding whether the quarantine was legal or illegal. 
Realistically appraising that Security Council authorization would not 
be forthcoming due to the potential of the Soviet veto, the u.s. legal 
spokesmen argued that such authorization could be given after the fact, 
or was wholly not applicable. Their arguments were found to be uncon-
vincing; yet, this did not mean the quarantine was illegal, or that the 
United States had violated some provision of the U.N. Charter. It was 
shol.m that a perfectly legitimate case could be made for the quarantine 
action by a reexamination of the fundamental purposes of the United 
Nations. Showing how the primary purpose of the organization was not 
being served because of an inoperative Article 53(1), t~ legality of 
the quarantine was established by arguing for the purpose instead of the 
rule. This method of proof squared with reality, and "stretched" no 
rule of law. It affirmed what has long been recognized. That the U.N·. 
Charter does not provide a firm method for resolving great power disputes, 
and in such cases, to judge whether an action is legal or illegal, one 
has to look beyond the rules which were designed to operate only under 
conditions of perfect .unanimityo 
Article _g 
This article was found to be a primary source of confusion through-
out the case. The inherent right of self defense has a great deal of 
subjective meaning, and the layman is prone to forget the important qual-
ification that the U.N •. Charter places on that meaning. However, the 
.! 
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definition of the qualification "armed attack" is by no means agreed 
upon by those who are professionally qualified to interpret such terms; 
and as presently written, Artic+e 51 is subject to extreme interpretations. 
For those who are secure and confident, the tendency would be to a narrow 
construction in order to hold it as a rule against others. For those 
who are insecure and nervous, the tendency would be. towards a broad 
construction. Yet, there are hazards either way. 
The study disclosed that a precedent was established on the mean-
ing of Article 51 which has been overlooked because it was not made 
explicitly kno~m as such. President Kennedy's rephrasing of Article 51 
. 
was an important indicator of the inadequacy of "armed attack" as the 
standard criteria for determining when self defense begins. 
Article 53(1) 
This article is in need of revision in order to make it alive again. 
Unrealistically, it assun:es Big 5 unanimity, and in its present form that 
results in it being a dead letter obstacle. A majority vote provision 
I 
I 
here would have immediately approved the quarantine, eliminated the question 
· of legality, and still retained a measure of its original concept. 
Quarantine ~ !: Concept for Future Operations 
It is not believed that the quarantine established any kind of 
"cold war" blockade rule that could, be relied upon in the future unless 
the.user is prepared to.play for the same stakeso 
\ 
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